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  • Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure despite ongoing ceasefire negotiations, potentially exploiting vague terms to use shorter-range artillery while adhering to a moratorium on long-range strikes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
  • Senior Russian officials are still demanding the "elimination of the root causes" of the war as a precondition for peace, which contradicts US President Trump's peace goals and refers to Russia's original demands for Ukrainian capitulation [6, 7, 8].
  • Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to create conditions for capturing Borova and Lyman [12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to increase salaries for Russian governors from January 2026, likely to secure regional leader loyalty amid uncertainty about Russia's future and the ongoing war [29, 30, 31].
  • Russian forces have recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, and in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions [33, 37, 59, 69].
• Ukrainian sources report that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are primarily using infantry assaults, rarely deploying armoured vehicles, and have a significant manpower advantage, sometimes as high as 10 to one [17, 18, 19].
• A Ukrainian brigade in the Chasiv Yar direction reported repelling a Russian mechanized assault which included 18 motorcycles [52].
• Ukrainian sources indicate that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are using motorcycles, buggies, electric scooters, and even Soviet-era T-55 tanks and civilian cars to transport personnel to the front line, likely to minimise losses from drone strikes and address shortages of armoured vehicles [64, 65].
• Kursk and Belgorod Border - Russian forces recently advanced east of Oleshnya in Kursk Oblast and in central Demidovka in Belgorod Oblast amid continued fighting in these border regions [33, 37, 38].
• Kharkiv Oblast - Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City but made no advances. Ukrainian sources reported increased Russian activity near Vovchansk, including mechanized assaults and intensified glide bomb strikes [39, 40, 41].
• Luhansk Oblast - Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction but made no advances. Ukrainian sources reported Russian attempts to build pontoon crossings near Dvorichna and increased glide bomb strikes on Kupyansk [42, 43, 44, 45].
• Lyman Direction - Russian forces expanded their bridgehead northeast of Lyman, advancing northwest of Novolyubivka and southeast of Nove. They are focusing on creating conditions to seize Borova and Lyman, potentially to capture the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast [12, 13, 21, 22, 23].
• Siversk Direction - Russian forces continued offensive operations but made no confirmed advances. Ukrainian sources reported Russian forces using civilian vehicles and motorcycles in assaults in this area [46, 47, 48].
• Chasiv Yar Direction - Russian forces continued offensive operations but made no advances. Ukrainian sources reported Russian attempts to move around the area via pipelines and use armoured vehicles only in foggy or rainy conditions. A Ukrainian brigade repelled a Russian mechanized assault including motorcycles [49, 50, 51, 52, 53].
• Toretsk Direction - Russian forces continued offensive operations but made no confirmed advances. Ukrainian sources reported intensified Russian assaults on the northern flank of Toretsk with small infantry groups attempting to infiltrate the city [54, 55, 56, 57, 58].
• Pokrovsk Direction - Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Bohdanivka. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are focusing attacks east of Pokrovsk and using unconventional vehicles like motorcycles and electric scooters, with a significant artillery advantage [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68].
• Kurakhove Direction - Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Andriivka and seized Rozlyv. Fighting continues west and southwest of Kurakhove [69, 70, 71, 72, 73].
• Velyka Novosilka Direction - Russian forces continued offensive operations but made no advances. Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault southeast of Skudne [74, 75, 76].
• Western Zaporizhia Oblast - Russian forces continued offensive operations but made no confirmed advances. Ukrainian sources reported Russian forces moving military equipment towards the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, potentially indicating preparations for a southern offensive [77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85].
• Dnipro River Direction - Russian forces continued offensive operations but did not advance [86, 87, 88].
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`, ``, ``). I ensured correct heading levels and list formatting. I double-checked that the overall structure matched the "RESPONSE STRUCTURE" example provided in the prompt. 10. **Final Review:** I performed a final review to check for: - Completeness: Did I address all sections of the prompt? - Accuracy: Does the summary accurately reflect the ISW report? - Formatting: Is the HTML correct and as specified? Are sources correctly linked? - Language: Is the summary in British English? - Source Number Consistency: Are all cited sources listed in the "Sources" section and vice versa? Are the source numbers correct throughout the summary? By following these step-by-step instructions and double-checking each stage, I aimed to produce a summary that is accurate, comprehensive, and correctly formatted according to the user's detailed instructions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Summary, 1st April 2025

The full ISW Report used to create this summary, as well as all historical reports for the Ukraine-War can be found at ISW - Ukraine Project

Key Developments

Notable Anecdotes

Frontline Summary

Additional Points of Note

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to raise salaries for Russian governors starting in January 2026, aligning their pay with deputy prime ministers. This delayed increase is likely aimed at securing the loyalty of regional leaders amid ongoing uncertainty related to the war and economy [29, 30, 31].

Sources