ATP Geopolitics | ATP Distilled

ISW Daily Report Summary

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Summary, 23rd December 2024

The full ISW Report used to create this summary, as well as all historical reports for the Ukraine-War can be found at ISW - Ukraine Project

Key Developments

  • Russian forces are advancing south and southwest of Pokrovsk, but the priority between enveloping the town and reaching the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary remains unclear [1, 2, 3].
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin may be prioritising territorial gains over seizing significant settlements, possibly to project inevitable victory [4, 5].
  • Responsibility for the Pokrovsk direction is split between the 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), with limited activity observed in the 41st CAA's area of responsibility [6, 7, 8].
  • Decreased combat effectiveness among Russian forces, particularly within the 90th Tank Division, may be slowing their advance in the Pokrovsk direction [9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
  • Increased Russian armoured vehicle losses, especially in units engaged in prolonged frontline combat, may impact the rate of advance in certain sectors [14, 15].
  • North Korea plans to deploy more troops and weapons to Russia, despite over 3,000 North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast [16, 17].
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to undermine Western unity in supporting Ukraine [25, 26, 27, 28].
  • The Kremlin may be setting information conditions for a false flag operation in Transnistria to destabilise Moldova and hinder its EU integration [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34].
  • Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn from most positions in Syria, retaining presence only at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40].
  • Germany announced additional military assistance for Ukraine, including Patriot launchers, Leopard tanks, and various other equipment [41, 42].

Notable Anecdotes

  • Russian authorities are issuing North Korean troops fake identification documents with Russian names and Republic of Tuva birthplaces to conceal their presence [18].
  • Language barriers between Russian and North Korean forces are hindering operations, with North Koreans reportedly conducting initial assaults followed by Russian forces securing positions [19, 20, 21].
  • US intelligence suggests North Korea initially proposed deploying troops to Russia, not the Kremlin [22].
  • 60 percent of artillery and mortar shells used by Russian forces in Ukraine reportedly come from North Korea [23].
  • North Korea is expanding a missile manufacturing facility producing KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles [23].
  • Russia has reportedly provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil since March 2024, double the UN sanction limit [24].
  • Russia may be paying up to $572 million yearly for the North Korean troop deployment to Russia [23].
  • A fire in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone destroyed $16 million worth of Shahed drone parts [48, 49].
  • Four Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the Kadamovsky Training Ground in Rostov Oblast, causing a fire and detonations at an ammunition depot [50].
  • Kirov Oblast officials are allegedly trying to transfer a mayor appointed through the "Time of Heroes" programme to the frontlines after he commented on corruption [100, 101, 102].
  • Relatives of the 11th Tank Regiment appealed to Putin and Defence Minister Belousov, describing assaults near Vovchansk and Hlyboke as a "conveyor belt of death" [104].

Frontline Summary

  • Kursk Oblast: Russian forces have advanced within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, with fighting continuing southeast of Korenevo and north and northeast of Sudzha [43, 44, 45, 46]. The Russian military command is reportedly misusing artillery specialists as assault forces in this direction [47].
  • Kharkiv Oblast: Russian forces continued ground attacks but made no confirmed advances [51]. Mechanized assaults are reportedly rare due to concerns over armoured vehicle shortages [52]. A Russian milblogger denied reports of a Ukrainian attack using only unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones near Lyptsi [53].
  • Luhansk Oblast: Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault [54, 55]. Unconfirmed reports suggest Russian forces have entered the suburbs of Kupyansk [56]. Fighting continues near various settlements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line [57, 58, 59, 60, 61].
  • Donetsk Oblast: Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast, east, southeast, and southwest of Siversk but did not advance [62, 63]. In the Chasiv Yar direction, no confirmed advances were made despite claims of seizing the Pivnichnyi Microraion [64, 65, 66]. A marginal advance was made in the Toretsk direction [67, 68]. Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk and Kurakhove without confirmed advances [71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78]. A marginal advance was made in the Vuhledar direction, and fighting continues near Velyka Novosilka [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87].
  • Southern Axis: Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia without confirmed advances [88, 89, 90, 91]. Fighting continues in the Dnipro River Delta, with no indications of a Russian buildup for an assault on the west bank [92, 93, 94, 95, 96].

Additional Points of Note

  • The Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" programme, aimed at appointing veterans to government positions, is causing conflict between veterans and regional officials [103].
  • Russian defence officials announced plans to expand higher military education to accommodate the expansion of the Russian military [105, 106].
  • The Russian Investigative Committee opened a corruption case against the Head of the MoD's Central Housing and Utilities Department [107].
  • Kalashnikov Concern announced the development of the new "Kub-10Ye" strike drone with a range and combat power reportedly exceeding previous models [108].
  • Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin to discuss infrastructure and vehicle manufacturing cooperation [109, 110, 111].
  • Lukashenko registered as a candidate for the 2025 Belarusian presidential elections [112].

Sources