Ukraine War Upd. EXTRA: Wartime Leader Zelenskyy, Ryan on Strategy, & Drip-Feed Theory

"A quick win, I don’t think, would have done that. A quick win would have maybe got Ukraine back to their 1991 territories or something like that, but then Russia wouldn’t have… they wouldn’t have lost those thousands and thousands of pieces of artillery, those thousands and thousands of pieces of equipment, like IFVs and tanks. It would have taken a quick beating, but then could have come back for more at a later date. And so actually, I can see the value in both of these approaches. But this kind of long-term approach is really, really frustrating, because you can also say, well, Ukraine could have won and they are being bled dry in terms of their own forces. But I think, I think we’ve probably reached that point where the Russians have been so fundamentally degraded and their economy is absolutely screwed in a long-term way now that, that now is actually the time - this could be the optimal kind of outlook. I mean, I’m being cynical here and I’m not thinking about the lives of Ukrainians, right? I’m literally doing this from a really dry, uh, cynical geopolitical stance, right? So remember that this might not be the most moral positioning from looking at certain angles here, although you could argue morally speaking, it’s the best because it stops Russia being able to do this going forward again to other places or taking this further into Eastern Europe. But we might have got to this point where actually that prolonged approach has done what it is going to do, which is degrade Russia massively in terms of equipment and personnel.”

Hello Team

🎦 00:00-00:18⏩

Jonathan welcomes viewers to an "Extra" video - extra tidbits and nuggets of information about the war in Ukraine. There's a live stream later with Ada Wadsworth from the charity "Cup".

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Simon Schuster: The Showman - Zelenskyy in the Early Days of War

🎦 00:18-10:31⏩

Jonathan reads an excerpt from the book "The Showman" by Simon Schuster, about Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Schuster, who met Zelenskyy before he became president, recounts Zelenskyy's reaction to the invasion, the offers for him to flee Ukraine, and his demeanor in the early days.

• Zelenskyy initially thought they could "beat them back".
• When European leaders offered to help him escape, he found it offensive that they'd written him off. He said "Excuse me - it's just poor manners"
• He told himself "They're watching. You're a symbol. You need to act the way a head of state must act"
• When news reached him of the attack on Hostomel Airport, he was enraged and told his troops to "Show no mercy - use all available weapons to wipe out every Russian thing there"
• He had a call with EU leaders and told them "This may be the last time you see me alive". He asked if Ukraine would be allowed to join the EU.
• Zelenskyy struggled in the early days. He had trouble sleeping and would "wake everybody up" as he didn't "have the right to sleep until I knew what strikes had landed where".
• He would request updates as early as 4:50 am.
• The excerpt describes how Zelenskyy coped with life in the bunker. He worked out on a bench press, played ping pong, and watched films (although he could no longer stomach Soviet comedies - "They revolt me, he said").
• The Kramatorsk train station attack horrified him particularly one photo of a woman who'd been beheaded by the blast. Zelenskyy said "She was wearing bright, memorable clothes". He said to Schuster "It was one of those times when your arms and legs are doing one thing, but your head does not listen - because your head is there, at that station".
• When asked if he hated the Russian troops he said "Yes, I feel hatred for the Russian troops"
• Zelenskyy wouldn't express hatred towards Putin saying "I'm not sure he knows what is happening". He felt that if he could take Putin on a tour of the war zone, the war might stop.
• Over time, Zelenskyy's demeanor changed. People stood to attention more and he was less relaxed.
• The excerpt describes Zelenskyy's secret visit to Kherson after it was liberated.
• Zelenskyy has been compared to Churchill, something he disliked "People say different things about him", he noted dryly. He doesn't admire Churchill's "record as an imperialist" and prefers to be associated with George Orwell or Charlie Chaplin. "These artists helped society" he said, "And their influence was often stronger than artillery"
• Schuster said that Zelenskyy "struck me as a naive charmer preparing to enter a world of cynics, on guard against thugs who took him for an easy mark". He said "The greatest changes took place in the first months of the Russian invasion - stubborn, confident, vengeful, impolitic, brave to the point of reckless, and unsparing towards those who stood in his way".
• By the end of 2019, power hadn't hardened him, but the war had changed him. His friends and staff were shocked by his transformation. Most Ukrainians (and Schuster) didn't think he had it in him. "Some aspects of his character worried me, especially imagining his leadership after the war" he said. "I don't know how Zelensky will handle that fraught transition, whether he will have the wisdom and restraint to part with the extraordinary powers granted to him under martial law, or whether he will find that power too addictive"
• The last time Schuster saw Zelenskyy was a few days before Christmas 2022 in Washington during his first foreign trip since the war began. "The war had not ended, not even close, but the man at the centre of it had finished his transformation into a wartime leader".
• Jonathan reflects "Some interesting reflections there and a lot more to in that, no doubt, to share to boot, but obviously don't have access to that - would be an interesting read, I am sure".

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Mick Ryan: Ukraine Should Embrace Positional Warfare

🎦 10:31-18:18⏩

Jonathan moves on to discuss an article by Mick Ryan, arguing that Ukraine should embrace positional warfare.

• Ryan argues that Ukraine should adopt a strategy of positional warfare in 2024. This would deny Russia major successes, bleeding them white while giving Ukraine a chance to reconstitute and prepare for larger-scale offensives in 2025.
• Jonathan agrees. He says Ukraine shouldn't be on the offensive, depleting their personnel and resources trying to attack and regain land. They should absorb Russian attempts to do so and attrit them in the process, which is what has been happening in Avdiivka, Sinkivka and other places. The Ukrainians can see from this that they've been able to inflict heavy losses on the Russians, both in personnel and equipment. The Russians might take some land, but at a high cost, leaving themselves vulnerable to counterattacks.
• Jonathan says Ukraine should continue this approach for a long time, to give them time to:
  • Reconstitute
  • Recruit and train more troops
  • Get more equipment
  • Secure funding from the US and allies
  • Get F-16s online
  • Build up stockpiles of longer-range munitions
• At the same time, Ukraine should use longer-range munitions to:
  • Strike targets within Crimea
  • Take out the Black Sea Fleet
  • Systematically eliminate air defence systems across the occupied regions
• This will ensure that when Ukraine is finally ready to attack, Russia will have been fundamentally degraded and depleted.
• Jonathan cites Ryan's five key priorities for Ukraine:
  • Priority 1: Improve individual and collective training in Ukraine and NATO countries to enable large-scale offensive operations. The 2023 counteroffensive highlighted this need, as the training provided wasn't ideal, either teaching the wrong skills or not being adapted enough to the frontline.
  • Priority 2: Rebuild Ukrainian and Western defence industrial capacity. Artillery production is a major issue, but other areas like drones, precision munitions, air defence missiles, and other military equipment also need to be scaled up.
  • Priority 3: Rethink strategy. The West's strategy of providing just enough for defence but not enough for victory must change. It needs to embrace the goal of defeating Russia. Ukraine also needs a new military strategy for modern warfare, as the existing NATO combined arms and air land doctrine is inadequate.
  • Priority 4: Rethink and reinvigorate strategic influence operations. Ukraine was inspiring in 2022, and they need to build on that in 2024. Western nations also need to better explain the purpose of supporting Ukraine, emphasising that investing in Ukrainian victory now will be cheaper and less bloody in the long run.
  • Priority 5: Conduct strategic strikes inside Russia against military targets and launch maritime strikes in the Black Sea. This will shape the conditions for future offensives.
• Jonathan points out that while there are political challenges to adopting positional warfare, it's not passive and doesn't mean accepting a Russian victory. It's a temporary strategy to buy time. Jonathan reveals that he has been advocating for this strategy all along, and he's glad that others like Andrew Perpetua agree. Perpetua believes that the 2023 counteroffensive should never have happened, as Ukraine wasn't ready. Zelenskyy was reluctant and kept delaying it but they still hadn't received crucial equipment like Abrams tanks, Atakams, and hadn't finished training their troops. Jonathan thinks that if the West were to now provide Ukraine with hundreds of Atakams, cruise missiles, F-16s, Gripens, etc. they would win.
• Jonathan encourages viewers to listen to Ryan's full commentary on his Substack, "Future Doctrina." He acknowledges his own self-doubt, saying "I'm no expert. I don't know what I'm talking about. I'm just some random philosophical dude um that has started talking about the war," but he is heartened by the fact that his views are shared by experts like Mick Ryan.

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Edward Hunter Christie on the Drip-Feed Theory

🎦 18:18-26:07⏩

Jonathan pivots to a discussion about the drip-feed theory and opinions of Edward Hunter Christie, a senior research fellow with a PhD at the Belgian Military Academy. He refers to an interview by French journalist Elsa Vidal with Christie.

• Vidal argues that Western governments deliberately starved Ukraine of decisive weapons.
• She believes this is a deliberate strategy to prolong the war, enabling a fundamental degradation of Russia, not just militarily but also economically. The ongoing sanctions, gradually intensified over time, contribute to Russia's decline.
• This approach contrasts with providing overwhelming support to Ukraine at the outset, which could have led to a faster Russian defeat but might not have weakened them as much in the long term.
• While acknowledging the suffering this strategy inflicts on Ukrainians, the long-term approach might ultimately be more beneficial, preventing future Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The drip-feed strategy serves to weaken Russia profoundly, potentially crippling its geopolitical standing for a generation.
• Vidal also criticises the Rand Corporation for advocating for a strategy of neither defeat nor victory in Ukraine. She argues that this approach makes it harder to maintain political will and support for Ukraine. Jonathan agrees, pointing out that the US, in particular, seems to be losing its resolve. He believes this stems from the lack of a clear goal. Instead of choosing a decisive path, the US pursued a "middle of the road" approach, which has proven costly and ineffective.
• Vidal concludes that many experts and politicians believe Ukraine should aim for victory.
• Jonathan draws parallels between this analysis and his own earlier observations, noting that the intentional delay in providing sufficient aid might be a result of a fear of escalation within the US government. He recalls Lloyd Austin's statement in April 2022, where he explicitly stated that the US wanted to see Russia fundamentally degraded by the war. This suggests that the focus was not solely on securing a Ukrainian victory but rather on exploiting the conflict to weaken Russia in the long run.
• He analyses that a quick Ukrainian victory might have reversed some territorial losses but would not have inflicted the same level of damage to Russia's military capabilities. Russia might have recovered and posed a threat again in the future.
• Jonathan acknowledges the ethical dilemma, balancing the potential for a swift Ukrainian victory against the objective of crippling Russia's ability to wage war in the future. He leans towards the view that the prolonged conflict, while tragic, might have achieved the desired outcome - Russia is severely weakened. If the West were to significantly increase military support now, Ukraine could likely achieve a decisive victory, achieving both goals.
• Jonathan invites his viewers to share their thoughts on whether the US's approach has been deliberate or driven by a fear of escalation.

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Wrap up

🎦 26:07-26:24⏩

Jonathan concludes the Extra video, thanking viewers and reminding them that he'll be back later with a frontline update. "Thank you, take care. Speak soon. Toodlepips" he says.

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