Extracted Chat w/ Andrew Perpetua: Losses & the State of the Ukraine War
Title:Extracted Chat w/ Andrew Perpetua: Losses & the State of the Ukraine War Topics:Hello Team, Andrew Perpetua on Interpreting Loss Data, Analysis of Recent Ukrainian Losses (Kursk/Sumy Focus), Clarification on 'Double Counting' Losses, Rubicon Drone Unit Operations & Losses (South Donetsk), Sign
Table of Contents 📖
"I don't think Putin understands what's going on in this war... Just like I don't think Trump understands what's going on. They live in these information bubbles where they are kind of immune from reality."
Hello Team
🎦 00:00-00:07⏩
- Jonathan introduces the segment, indicating it features Andrew Perpetua's interpretation of loss data previously discussed.
- He notes a second video covering sheets 11-19 will follow.
Andrew Perpetua on Interpreting Loss Data
🎦 00:17-00:50⏩
- Jonathan welcomes Andrew Perpetua.
- Jonathan mentions having reviewed Andrew's 19 sheets of loss data.
- He reiterates a point made earlier: classifying Russian losses is complex because non-standard vehicles (like civilian trucks) are often used as combat assets, potentially skewing simple combat asset loss counts.
Analysis of Recent Ukrainian Losses (Kursk/Sumy Focus)
🎦 00:50-03:56⏩
- Jonathan observes that Andrew's data shows significant Ukrainian kit losses recently, though not necessarily high-value items like the USV/UAV strike examples. Losses were mainly infantry mobility vehicles and similar items.
- He asks if this was mainly due to the Kursk Oblast incursion.
- Andrew confirms a lot of losses occurred in Kursk Oblast, but stresses they happened over time during the operation, not just during the withdrawal.
- Many Bradleys listed as lost were actually damaged or abandoned months prior (e.g., September) and only confirmed as lost later when Russian footage showed them still in place or destroyed.
- The Rubicon drone unit inflicted damage on the highway (Kursk/Sumy access route?), destroying a Bradley, 10-15 MRAPs, several Kirpis (which they seemed to target specifically), Humvees, and pickup trucks – mostly not 'super valuable' kit.
- Significant losses also occurred on a highway in Sumy Oblast (likely access route to Kursk Oblast), including MRAPs and M113s, in an area Russia subsequently captured (Andrew mentions near Basivka).
Clarification on 'Double Counting' Losses
🎦 03:56-04:45⏩
- Jonathan confirms his understanding, aligning with Andrew's explanation: losses appearing during withdrawal footage often represent accumulated damage/abandonments over months.
- He highlights that Andrew's spreadsheets correctly distinguish between 'damaged', 'abandoned', and 'destroyed' states, even if the same piece of equipment appears multiple times as its status changes (e.g., abandoned, then later hit by an IED and marked destroyed). This clarifies why loss numbers might seem inflated at first glance.
Rubicon Drone Unit Operations & Losses (South Donetsk)
🎦 04:45-05:54⏩
- Andrew notes further losses in Kharkiv and South Donetsk.
- The Rubicon drone unit also operated around Velyka Novosilka, attacking logistics routes north of the town.
- Their performance here was less impressive ("just a normal drone unit"), but they still destroyed Huskies, Bushmasters, Humvees, and a few Ukrainian Bohdana self-propelled howitzers.
Significance of Ukrainian-Produced Equipment Losses
🎦 05:54-06:24⏩
- Jonathan sees a "weird silver lining" in the loss of Ukrainian-produced equipment like Bohdanas and Novators.
- While losing kit is never good, it indicates that Ukraine's domestic production is increasing and supplying the front lines.
European/German Role in Ukrainian Equipment Production
🎦 06:24-08:26⏩
- Andrew adds that Europe, particularly Germany, is also producing equipment for Ukraine.
- He thinks Germany might be making chassis for Bohdanas and potentially other vehicles.
- This is partly driven by Germany's poor economic situation; truck manufacturers with low demand for civilian trucks have spare capacity and are seeking contracts, including from Ukraine.
- Andrew clarifies these are often deals between German companies and Ukraine, not necessarily direct German government initiatives (though funding routes can be complex via EU etc.).
- Jonathan connects this to a Spanish company (Technova) licensing Ukrainian vehicle designs (Medevac, MRAP).
Andrew's Assessment of Russian Forces' Condition
🎦 08:26-10:21⏩
- Jonathan asks Andrew for his overall assessment of the front line.
- Andrew states Russia is in "really a lot of trouble", and this is being underplayed.
- Infantry: Russia has large numbers, but morale is very low due to a culture of abuse ("treating people like trash").
- Equipment: Critically important for getting infantry to the right place/time. Russia is "largely out of armor". They likely have only 1,000-2,000 significant armoured vehicles left and low manufacturing rates (a few hundred/year).
- They are "really running out".
Russian Armour Refurbishment & Tactics
🎦 10:21-12:29⏩
- Andrew observes that Russian armour appears in batches, suggesting it's refurbished or repaired stock.
- He gives an example of a recent large attack near Chasiv Yar using upgraded BMP-2s (BMP-2M Berezhok / 675 SB3KDZ variant).
- He speculates these were likely damaged/destroyed hulls recovered from previous battles (e.g., Avdiivka), sent back to Russia, completely rebuilt/upgraded, and then deployed as a batch.
- Crucially, this entire batch was lost in the Chasiv Yar attack.
- This refurbishment effort isn't sufficient to replace losses; they can't manufacture or refurbish enough.
Ineffectiveness of Russian Light Vehicle Assaults
🎦 12:29-14:24⏩
- Andrew emphasizes that light vehicles (Ladas, UAZ 'loaves' etc.) cannot replace proper armour. They are useful only for surprise attacks.
- He cites a recent Russian attack near Verkhnokamyanske using ~13 light vehicles (Ladas etc.).
- Ukraine defended using DPICM cluster munitions (likely what "Depikim" refers to) and Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGS).
- The light vehicles couldn't withstand these weapons; everything was wiped out, possibly with no survivors, and the assault never even reached its objective.
- Andrew notes this is increasingly common: Russian assaults being destroyed before reaching the front line (mentions a humorous example from IMI geolocations). They lack the armoured punch to break through.
Role of Artillery vs. Drones in Defence
🎦 14:24-15:56⏩
- Jonathan asks about the relative importance of drones versus artillery.
- Andrew cites a comment, possibly from the 46th Airmobile Brigade, regarding a Russian attack in Andriivka.
- Ukraine reportedly repelled the attack using 600 artillery shells and 200 drones.
- The result: every piece of Russian armour and light vehicle was destroyed, and there were no Russian survivors.
- Jonathan notes this highlights artillery remains "pretty damn useful". Andrew points to the specific attack route ("that arrow there") on the map where this occurred.
Ukrainian Offensive Potential vs. Attritional Defence
🎦 15:56-19:23⏩
- Jonathan asks if Ukraine can still mount major offensives to retake significant land.
- Andrew argues Ukraine doesn't need to launch a major offensive.
- Instead, they should focus on wearing out the Russians through defence. Russia will eventually "leave on their own" because they lack the strength to defend passively.
- Passive defence for Russia means unsustainable casualties (tens of thousands/month), systematic destruction of defences, and eventual withdrawal.
- Russia cannot sustain the manpower losses from current attrition levels if they just sit passively ("5 or 10% chance to die every single day"). Morale would collapse.
- Holding defensively would require millions of men, which Russia doesn't have.
- Therefore, Russia must keep attacking (active offensive means) because passive defence is "effectively impossible" for them.
- Jonathan asks if Russia loses more attacking vs defending, suggesting Ukraine might prefer defending as it's more attritional for Russia. Andrew agrees attacking is generally worse, but stresses passive defence under current conditions (constant drone/artillery threat) is also highly costly and demoralising for Russia.
Situation Update: Belgorod/Kursk Border Incursions
🎦 19:23-21:46⏩
- Jonathan asks about the situation in Belgorod Oblast (misspoke as Belgrade).
- Andrew points to dots on the map (highway north of Popivka/Demidovka) representing Russia's main logistics route in the area being targeted.
- Ukrainian actions are cutting off Russian reinforcements and logistics.
- Russia is counter-attacking to retake lost ground (e.g., back in Demidovka, possibly contested Popivka), but facing heavy casualties and difficulties.
- Problems for Russia include:
- Destroyed bridges (Ukraine blew them up).
- Attempts to lay pontoons are being targeted by Ukraine.
- Few roads, many unpaved/farm tracks, making movement hard.
- Remote towns, requiring infantry to dismount far away and march.
Ukraine's Objective in Border Incursions
🎦 21:46-22:15⏩
- Jonathan asks about Ukraine's endgame in the border area.
- Andrew believes the primary goal was simply to create a buffer zone between Russia and Sumy Oblast.
- Ukraine would prefer fighting in Russian territory (like Popivka) than in Ukraine proper.
Russian Capability to Attack Sumy/Chernihiv
🎦 22:15-24:45⏩
- Jonathan asks if Russia has momentum to push further south from Kursk/Belgorod into Ukraine (Sumy).
- Andrew describes Sumy Oblast as very difficult terrain to attack: dense forests, few spindly roads through forests, strong Ukrainian trench systems. "A defender's dream".
- Russia might capture border regions but struggle deeper in.
- He notes Ukraine has warned about potential Russian attacks towards Chernihiv (as they have in previous years), but doubts Russia currently has the military capability for a successful large-scale offensive into Sumy or Chernihiv.
- Andrew states Ukraine genuinely believed Russia was going to attack Sumy, which prompted their own incursion into Kursk/Belgorod ("Sucha" mentioned here, unclear reference).
- He concludes Russia is "not successful doing much of anything anymore" and may not even have a coherent plan.
Putin's Endgame & Understanding of the War
🎦 24:45-28:06⏩
- Jonathan relays a viewer question (from Javier Alvarez) about Putin's endgame and whether he'll take a potential "Trump lifeline".
- Andrew believes Putin fundamentally misunderstands the war, living in an "information bubble" immune from reality, similar to Trump.
- He thinks Putin genuinely believes Ukraine is "on its last legs" and "one more push" will break them.
- Jonathan questions how Putin reconciles this belief with three years of failure. Andrew suggests Putin might lack tactical/operational awareness but must be frustrated.
- Andrew posits that the Russian military command structure perpetuates this bubble. Due to the culture of blame-shifting, commanders cover themselves by reporting successes (even declaring towns captured before attacking them) and forcing troops on futile "suicide missions" to fulfill unrealistic orders from above. This misinformation likely reaches Putin.
Russian Propaganda vs. Reality
🎦 28:06-29:39⏩
- Andrew suggests Russian propaganda likely reflects Putin's own distorted beliefs, aiming to create a narrative matching his worldview.
- Jonathan notes the higher-level question this raises: if Putin is brainwashed, who by? Suggests some in the military must recognise reality.
- Andrew counters that the blame-shifting culture means even those who see reality won't report it upwards accurately.
- The propaganda desperately tries to paint a false image of Russian power and imminent Ukrainian collapse, ignoring Russia's actual problems.
Russia's Dependence on Foreign Aid & Potential Levers
🎦 29:39-30:39⏩
- Andrew highlights Russia's severe problems:
- Economy is "trash".
- Running out of equipment.
- Completely dependent on foreign military aid (North Korea, Iran, etc.).
- He controversially suggests Russia might now be more dependent on foreign aid than Ukraine is.
- He believes the West could cripple Russia by leveraging relationships, particularly with China regarding North Korean aid.
US Secondary Sanctions & Trump's Impact
🎦 30:39-31:43⏩
- Jonathan agrees leverage exists, noting the Biden administration's Treasury Department (under Janet Yellen) was making progress with secondary sanctions.
- These sanctions were starting to impact banks and ports in India and China, discouraging transactions and handling of Russian oil. This required constant effort ("global whack-a-mole") but was having an effect.
- Andrew suggests this was a tool Trump could have used effectively.
- Instead, Trump started trade wars "with everyone", giving Russia "breathing room" and undermining the sanctions effort – something Jonathan finds infuriatingly counter-productive ("insanity").
Geopolitical Strategy: China, US & Europe
🎦 31:43-32:49⏩
- Andrew reiterates that the West has levers, particularly with China regarding North Korea, but lacks leaders willing to use them rationally (e.g., through negotiation with clear demands and mutual benefits). Current leaders seem to prefer "hoping for the best and doing nothing".
- Jonathan mentions Hungary as a disappointing factor in Europe.
Trump's Strategy Towards Europe
🎦 32:49-34:14⏩
- Andrew outlines what he sees as Trump's "pretty genius" (though destructive) strategy towards Europe:
- Effectively withdraw US support/engagement from Europe.
- Periodically offer false hope by calling/visiting European leaders and telling them what they want to hear.
- This dangling of hope paralyses Europe, preventing them from accepting the reality that the US relationship is fundamentally broken and acting decisively on their own.
- Andrew wishes Europe would recognise this tactic and break free from the "eternal hope that everything will go back to normal".
Europe's Potential & Need for Independence
🎦 34:14-35:38⏩
- Jonathan agrees Europe needs to "be done with the US" and act more assertively, like China.
- He heard analysis suggesting Europe holds cards against US trade actions but hasn't played them yet, preferring negotiation.
- He believes China is better positioned to win a trade war with the US (dictatorship can absorb more pain, holds leverage).
- Jonathan sees the outcome – Europe being torn from the US – as something Russia and China wanted, and Trump's actions are achieving it, even if it wasn't the broader US goal.
Andrew Perpetua's Workload & Increased Video Volume
🎦 35:38-36:44⏩
- Jonathan thanks Andrew for his time and appreciates his loss list work.
- Andrew confirms he is "insanely overworked".
- Since around January, his team's daily workload has doubled:
- From ~750 spreadsheet lines/day to ~1200-1300 lines/day.
- From ~160 videos processed/day to ~300 videos/day.
Reasons for Increased Video Content & Impact of Analysis
🎦 36:44-37:53⏩
- Jonathan asks why the volume has increased.
- Andrew speculates it's not necessarily more activity, but both sides releasing more footage.
- He thinks this is partly a reaction to analysis drawing attention to specific areas (e.g., Artem's articles on drone interceptions prompted both Ukraine and Russia to release more videos on that topic).
- "The more attention we bring to things... the more it gets posted of that thing."
Challenges of Analysing High-Volume/Poorly Edited Content
🎦 37:53-38:56⏩
- This feedback loop creates challenges. Andrew mentions they dislike practices like channels putting 100 events in a 90-second video because it's "very stressful" to analyse.
- He specifically names Robert Macchiato as an example, noting he now shows nine events simultaneously in tiles, making analysis incredibly difficult and "soul-destroying".
- They try not to draw attention to such channels to avoid encouraging these annoying editing practices.
Call for Help & Final Thoughts (Partial)
🎦 38:56-39:40⏩
- Jonathan asks if Andrew needs help.
- Andrew confirms they desperately need help with video analysis, but it requires people with specific skills and a huge commitment.
- He mentions there are "lesser things" people could potentially help with (transcript cuts off before details).
Wrap up
🎦 39:40-39:40⏩
- The extracted chat concludes here, mid-sentence, as Andrew was discussing the need for help with his analysis work.