Ukraine War Update NEWS: Pt 1 - Overnight & Other News, Ru Loss Claims Analysis
Table of Contents 📖
"Who needs the world if Russia isn't in it?"
Hello Team
🎦 00:00-00:32⏩
Jonathan welcomes everyone to the first part of the Ukraine War update for the 30th January 2024. He explains that he had to re-record the video due to issues with the sound.
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🪦 DISCLAIMER FOR GENERAL STAFF LOSSES DATA
- These are real people with real lives and real families who love them. Don’t let the numbers sap your humanity.
- These numbers probably aren’t accurate but they’re the best we have and we don’t need them to be accurate to be indicative of patterns of activity.
- All losses are estimates. Losses cannot be counted with accuracy because of the conditions on the ground.
- Both sides would see it to be of their advantage to minimize their own losses maximize the other side’s losses.
- Neither side releases their losses but we have enough transparency from the Ukrainian side to have confidence in they are indicative.
- Personnel losses are hard to count. If a soldier gets injured, heals up, and returns to the front line only to get injured again, is that one loss or two? Also, how to deal with losses from PMC’s or soldiers fighting with RF from occupied territories?
- Equipment losses are hard to count. If an AA complex involves several parts and one part gets disabled, is that a loss, or a fraction of a loss? If a tank gets disabled, repaired, back into the fight, then disabled again, is that one lost tank or two?
- All recorded losses are vulnerable to multiple reporting. We have already seen numerous cases of multiple drones in the air reporting the same loss from different angles as multiple engagements.
- Losses are not always reported on the same day they occurred. It is frequent that drone losses are reported at least 24 hours after other terrestrial equipment losses. Certain losses may not be reported for days or weeks for military intelligence reasons.
Ukraine General Staff Daily Loss Figures
🎦 00:32-02:19⏩
Jonathan reviews the Ukrainian General Staff figures for the 28th January 2024. He notes that Russia has suffered heavy losses but urges caution as always and reminds viewers to refer to caveats in the video description. Reported losses include 960 personnel, 10 tanks, 29 armoured personnel vehicles, 31 artillery systems (described by Jonathan as "very high"). In addition, Russia is reported to have lost three anti-air warfare systems, a Su-34 aircraft and 42 vehicles and fuel tanks (again, "a high number"). Jonathan suggests that the destruction of Russian air defence systems could be part of a strategy to pave the way for F-16s as well as to limit Russia's ability to attack Ukrainian positions and cities.
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Andrew Perpetua's Loss Analysis
🎦 02:19-06:10⏩
Jonathan refers to military equipment loss data from researcher and OSINT analyst Andrew Perpetua who reports Russian equipment losses running at a ratio of 5:1. Jonathan observes that the destruction of Russian military equipment by the Ukrainians is having a significant impact but that the real question is the personnel loss ratio. He postulates that if Ukraine is using its equipment more sparingly and further away from the front lines, this would necessitate Russian forces using their drones and other assets to target troops in trenches rather than equipment (which would be easier to spot). Jonathan goes on to analyse footage of Ukrainian losses including a damaged M2 Bradley (damaged by shelling), a Leopard 2A6 tank (reported to have sustained minimal damage from a Lancet drone strike) and a damaged Grad MLRS. Jonathan explains that the information on the Oryx blog does not include the extent of any damage so whilst some of the equipment may be destroyed, others may have only sustained minimal damage. On the subject of Russian losses, he notes a significant number of destroyed BMP-1, BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) have been destroyed alongside numerous "soft skin" logistics vehicles such as civilian trucks, Ural trucks, SUVs. These losses will be having an impact on Russian logistics.
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Downed Russian Su-34 in Luhansk
🎦 06:10-07:18⏩
Jonathan voices his scepticism at some of the early reports of downed Russian aircraft but believes that the reported loss of a Russian Su-34 in Luhansk is probably accurate. He explains that footage of downed aircraft often emerges much later due to the location of the crash site (which could be deep inside Russian-held territory).
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UK Intelligence Update - Russian Vehicle Losses
🎦 07:18-09:37⏩
Jonathan cites a UK Ministry of Defence intelligence update which estimates that Russia has lost 2,600 main battle tanks and 4,900 armoured combat vehicles since the start of the invasion. He highlights the point that Russia has lost 40% fewer armoured vehicles in 2023 than in 2022 and suggests that this is likely due to the static nature of the frontline during 2023 when Russia adopted a largely defensive posture. He notes that Russian armoured vehicle losses have increased since the start of their offensive in the Donbas (in early October 2023) but that they have only made minor territorial gains for the losses they have sustained. Despite this, the UK MoD believes that Russia is still able to produce 100 tanks per month and so should be able to sustain this level of offensive activity for the foreseeable future. Jonathan questions the validity of these production figures.
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Analysis of Russian Armoured Vehicle Losses and Production
🎦 09:37-11:09⏩
Jonathan questions whether Russian production figures tell the full story and suspects that the true picture is being masked by the inclusion of refurbished vehicles. He cites OSINT analysis conducted by Andrew Perpetua which suggests that the rate at which Russia is pulling older vehicles out of storage to replace losses indicates that their rate of production of new vehicles is insufficient to keep pace with their losses at the front. Jonathan argues that whilst pulling vehicles out of storage might seem like a good short-term fix, it simply means that Russia will reach a "tipping point" sooner.
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Ukrainian Drone Advantage - Kherson/Zaporizhzhia Front
🎦 11:09-14:17⏩
Jonathan highlights a report by military analyst Dimitri (from War Translated) that Ukraine has stepped up its use of FPV drones equipped with night vision capability along the Kherson/Zaporizhzhia front line. This claim is corroborated by a Russian serviceman who warns his comrades to be careful. Jonathan suggests that donations from fundraisers are probably enabling Ukraine to procure large numbers of drones which would not show up on "official" equipment statistics. He cautions against extrapolating this localised tactical advantage across the entirety of the front line or using it to draw wider conclusions about overall Ukrainian drone capability or capacity. He illustrates his point with an example - that even if one side was able to produce a highly advanced drone, it wouldn't matter if they were only able to produce a handful of them. Jonathan goes on to share a video shared by Dimitri of a Russian truck which narrowly avoided being destroyed by a loitering munition which can be seen embedded in the windscreen.
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Chelyabinsk Explosion
🎦 14:17-14:32⏩
Jonathan reports an explosion at an electrical substation in Chelyabinsk, Russia.
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Russian Drone and Missile Attacks - Overnight 28th/29th January 2024
🎦 14:32-18:06⏩
Jonathan reports that Russia attacked Ukraine with Shahed-136 drones overnight. He states that Ukraine shot down 15 of the 35 drones launched representing a poor interception rate (less than 50%). He notes that Russian forces appear to be targeting frontline infrastructure and military facilities in the Kherson Oblast with some success, probably due to Ukraine prioritising the defence of strategic targets and cities further away from the front line. He suspects that a lot of footage of successful Russian strikes on Ukrainian military and industrial targets is not being released and cites the example of strikes on targets in Kyiv and Kremenchuk (which were reportedly hit on two consecutive nights) as examples. Jonathan suggests that Russia is deliberately probing Ukrainian air defences in order to identify and exploit weaknesses. He refers to footage of a fuel depot in Zameev (Kharkiv Oblast) which was attacked by Russian forces using S-300 missiles. He observes that whilst not as accurate, Russia has increased its use of S-300 missiles due to their trajectory making them difficult for Ukraine to shoot down.
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Explosions in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Obolonskyi and Sviatoshynskyi districts
🎦 18:06-18:27⏩
Jonathan reports explosions in Kyiv, Kharkiv and the Obolonskyi and Sviatoshynskyi districts of Kyiv. He notes a report from defence analyst Tim White that Ukrainian air defences were active south of Kyiv.
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Russian Claims - Downed Drones in Russia & Crimea
🎦 18:27-19:18⏩
Jonathan reports Russian claims to have shot down 21 Ukrainian drones in Tula, Bryansk and Kaluga in Russia and Crimea. He notes that these claims are dubious and that Russia often claims its air defences successfully intercepted targets when in fact they missed.
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Explosions in Bryansk
🎦 19:18-20:02⏩
Jonathan reports explosions in the Bryansk and Kaluga regions of Russia. He notes that the drone which exploded in Kaluga exploded over an old depot and is unlikely to have caused much damage. Even so, he suggests that strikes like this have a psychological impact as they demonstrate Russia's vulnerability and force them to spread their air defence assets more thinly in an attempt to defend their vast territory.
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Issues with Russian Aviation
🎦 20:02-22:13⏩
Jonathan reports a number of incidents involving Russian aircraft. He cites a number of examples (shared by Tim White) including: An engine failure on board a Siberia Airlines A320 en route to Moscow's Domodedovo Airport from Omsk, a Skycopter flight from Perm to Moscow which had to return after 20 minutes due to autopilot failure, and a fire which broke out on board a Sukhoi Superjet 100 travelling from Harbin (China) to Yakutsk. In this incident, the aircraft landed safely and the fire (which started 26 minutes before landing) was blamed on an overheated power bank. Jonathan refers to comments from Anton Gerashchenko, an advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, who believes that the sanctions are impacting Russia's ability to maintain its aircraft (particularly the P&W engines used on Airbus A320 and A321 neo aircraft) and that this is leading to safety being compromised. He believes that it is only a matter of time before there is a serious incident resulting in loss of life. Jonathan notes that there have been 14 incidents involving Russian aircraft since the start of the year (2024), one third of which are attributable to engine failures.
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Russian Propagandists Discuss the War
🎦 22:13-28:26⏩
Jonathan shares observations from Julia Davis (who monitors Russian state TV) on an episode of Vladimir Solovyov's show in which the host and his guests appear to concede that Russia might lose the war in Ukraine. Jonathan notes that the panel believe that the US will "undermine itself" first thanks to political divisions which are being exploited and amplified by Russia. Jonathan picks up on a comment from Solovyov who, when faced with the possibility of Russia losing, asks rhetorically "Who needs the world if Russia isn't in it?". Jonathan is highly critical of this statement and counters that for the last 30 years, Russia has contributed very little to the world other than its leader using his position to enrich himself at the expense of his people. He argues that Russia's influence on the world stage has waned since the end of the Cold War and that this is not a bad thing. Jonathan draws parallels between Russian and British imperialism and the belief that Ukraine needs Russia to survive. He notes an encounter between a British diplomat and a Russian citizen who berated her with pro-war rhetoric (fuelled by propaganda). This demonstrates the effectiveness of the Kremlin's propaganda machine which has created an "information space" that feeds a dangerous sense of national identity.
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Belarussian and Russian Propagandists Discuss the War
🎦 28:26-31:12⏩
Jonathan moves on to analyse a discussion on Belarussian TV in which the host and his guest (a Russian propagandist) are discussing upcoming elections in Belarus and Russia. It is clear that both men know the elections will be rigged with the host stating that all alternative candidates are "fake". The guest responds that both elections are effectively plebiscites (in support of Lukashenko in Belarus and Putin in Russia) and that what matters is "victory", "sovereignty" and their shared vision for the "collective East". Jonathan observes that the fake elections are justified by their importance to the cause.
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POWs in Russian and Ukrainian Captivity
🎦 31:12-33:22⏩
Jonathan analyses a video showing Russian POWs in Ukrainian captivity. He notes that they appear to be in good health, well-fed, well-clothed and that the room they are being held in is clean and tidy with pictures on the walls. When asked by a Ukrainian official, the POWs confirm that they have no complaints about their treatment. Jonathan contrasts this with the treatment of Ukrainian POWs in Russian captivity. He reminds viewers that footage has emerged showing Ukrainian POWs who have clearly been mistreated (tortured) and are in poor health. He suggests that whilst Russia may be adhering to the Geneva Convention, they are only doing so to avoid being criticised by the international community.
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Wrap Up
🎦 33:22-33:50⏩
Jonathan thanks viewers for watching and encourages them to like, subscribe and share the video. He mentions that he has written an article on the latest season of the TV series "Fargo".
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