Ukraine War Update NEWS: 2x AP's Equipment Loss Lists, Backlog Clearing
Table of Contents 📖
"So the main functional need is getting troops from A to B to the contact line to attack on foot, rather than have tanks do tanky things."
Hello Team
🎦 00:00-00:49⏩
Jonathan introduces the topic - an addendum/appendix to the visually confirmed losses from Andrew Perpetua over the previous week. He explains that he will be looking at the losses from 08/01, 09/01 and 10/01/2025.
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🪦 DISCLAIMER FOR GENERAL STAFF LOSSES DATA
- These are real people with real lives and real families who love them. Don’t let the numbers sap your humanity.
- These numbers probably aren’t accurate but they’re the best we have and we don’t need them to be accurate to be indicative of patterns of activity.
- All losses are estimates. Losses cannot be counted with accuracy because of the conditions on the ground.
- Both sides would see it to be of their advantage to minimize their own losses maximize the other side’s losses.
- Neither side releases their losses but we have enough transparency from the Ukrainian side to have confidence in they are indicative.
- Personnel losses are hard to count. If a soldier gets injured, heals up, and returns to the front line only to get injured again, is that one loss or two? Also, how to deal with losses from PMC’s or soldiers fighting with RF from occupied territories?
- Equipment losses are hard to count. If an AA complex involves several parts and one part gets disabled, is that a loss, or a fraction of a loss? If a tank gets disabled, repaired, back into the fight, then disabled again, is that one lost tank or two?
- All recorded losses are vulnerable to multiple reporting. We have already seen numerous cases of multiple drones in the air reporting the same loss from different angles as multiple engagements.
- Losses are not always reported on the same day they occurred. It is frequent that drone losses are reported at least 24 hours after other terrestrial equipment losses. Certain losses may not be reported for days or weeks for military intelligence reasons.
Andrew Perpetua's Visually Confirmed Losses: Introduction
🎦 00:49-01:52⏩
Jonathan explains that the losses reported by Andrew Perpetua may have occurred weeks or even months before. He highlights that whilst the losses from the socials will only ever be a fraction of the actual numbers, even catching 200 personnel losses in a day highlights the scale of Russian losses.
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Personnel Losses 08/01/2025 - 10/01/2025
🎦 01:52-02:13⏩
Jonathan reports that visually confirmed personnel losses reported by Andrew Perpetua were: 191 on 08/01, 134 on 09/01 and 208 on 10/01. He caveats this by reminding viewers that these losses are likely to have occurred prior to the date they appear on the spreadsheet.
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Overview of Losses 08/01/2025
🎦 02:13-02:17⏩
Jonathan reports that visually confirmed losses for both sides for 08/01 were broadly comparable.
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Ukrainian Losses 08/01/2025
🎦 02:17-04:02⏩
Jonathan reports that Ukraine lost 2x Bradleys (destroyed and abandoned), 3x Strikers, and a number of MRAPS and other Western-provided vehicles. He questions whether it is better to see Bradleys on the list (as opposed to older vehicles such as BMP1s) if it means that Ukraine is deploying its best equipment.
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Russian Losses 08/01/2025
🎦 04:02-04:47⏩
Jonathan notes that Russia lost more equipment overall than Ukraine on 08/01, but this is mainly due to civilian vehicles. He reports that Russia lost six tanks and that almost all equipment was destroyed or abandoned.
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Overview of Losses 09/01/2025
🎦 04:47-05:37⏩
Jonathan notes that the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian losses has increased to 3:1, with Russia losing a significantly higher proportion of civilian vehicles, ATVs and trucks. He explains that this likely reflects the use of such vehicles by the Russian military.
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Ukrainian Losses 09/01/2025
🎦 05:37-06:54⏩
Jonathan reports that Ukraine lost another Bradley on 09/01 along with a number of BMP-1s and BMP2s, all its APC losses were M113s.
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Russian Losses 09/01/2025
🎦 06:54-07:27⏩
Jonathan reports that Russia lost a significant amount of equipment including a BM-21 Grad, a number of artillery pieces, 10x tanks, 10x IFVs, a number of APCs and over 10x ATVs.
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Overview of Losses 10/01/2025
🎦 07:27-07:36⏩
Jonathan reports that the ratio of losses is now 4:1 (Russia:Ukraine) with Russia losing a disproportionate number of civilian vehicles and ATVs which again likely reflects their use in the conflict.
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Ukrainian Losses 10/01/2025
🎦 07:36-09:17⏩
Jonathan notes that Ukrainian losses for 10/01 included an electronic warfare system, five tanks (mainly T-64s), a damaged Bradley. He comments that the ratio of abandoned/destroyed to damaged is high, but could be worse. Ukraine also lost a number of MRAPS, APCs, IMVs and civilian vehicles, but nothing of significant value. He explains the differences between IMVs, MRAPS, IFVs and APCs.
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Russian Losses 10/01/2025
🎦 09:17-11:51⏩
Jonathan reports that Russia lost a phenomenal amount of civilian vehicles (and speculates that a proportion of these would have been used for military purposes). Russia also lost an air defence system (a Pongae) which Jonathan believes was damaged in a friendly fire incident with a Russian Orlan drone that attacked a North Korean air defence system. Other Russian losses included 2x recovery vehicles, two howitzers, a number of 'tracked garden sheds', 10x IFVs, a number of MTLBs, almost 10x ATVs and a huge number of civilian vehicles.
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Jonathan's Analysis of Losses: Can Russia Sustain This?
🎦 11:51-12:47⏩
Jonathan summarises the losses over the three day period - Russia has lost a significant amount of equipment, more so that Ukraine. Although Ukrainian losses are comparable for tanks, IFVs and APCs, when you factor in the losses of civilian vehicles the difference is stark. Jonathan questions whether Russia can sustain these losses, particularly in terms of tanks and IFVs and notes that whilst it is easy to replace civilian vehicles, it is not so easy to replace the heavier equipment.
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Wrap up
🎦 12:48-13:15⏩
Jonathan thanks Andrew Perpetua and his team for their work and signs off.
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