Ukraine War Update NEWS: 2x AP's Equipment Loss Lists, Massive Russian Losses
Table of Contents 📖
"They are going to properly run out of some of these really important bits of kit, NTLBs, BMPs. They'll be losing BMPs at a rate that means they'll be only able to replace them with the manufactured from brand new BMP3s. They won't be able to bring any more BMP-2s and 1s out of deep storage."
Hello Team
🎦 00:00-00:29⏩
Jonathan welcomes viewers to an "appendix" news update where he'll be looking at a couple of Andrew Perpetua's equipment loss lists that he didn't get around to earlier. He comments that the numbers from January 1st are "stupendous" - likely because of a recent Magyar video.
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🪦 DISCLAIMER FOR GENERAL STAFF LOSSES DATA
- These are real people with real lives and real families who love them. Don’t let the numbers sap your humanity.
- These numbers probably aren’t accurate but they’re the best we have and we don’t need them to be accurate to be indicative of patterns of activity.
- All losses are estimates. Losses cannot be counted with accuracy because of the conditions on the ground.
- Both sides would see it to be of their advantage to minimize their own losses maximize the other side’s losses.
- Neither side releases their losses but we have enough transparency from the Ukrainian side to have confidence in they are indicative.
- Personnel losses are hard to count. If a soldier gets injured, heals up, and returns to the front line only to get injured again, is that one loss or two? Also, how to deal with losses from PMC’s or soldiers fighting with RF from occupied territories?
- Equipment losses are hard to count. If an AA complex involves several parts and one part gets disabled, is that a loss, or a fraction of a loss? If a tank gets disabled, repaired, back into the fight, then disabled again, is that one lost tank or two?
- All recorded losses are vulnerable to multiple reporting. We have already seen numerous cases of multiple drones in the air reporting the same loss from different angles as multiple engagements.
- Losses are not always reported on the same day they occurred. It is frequent that drone losses are reported at least 24 hours after other terrestrial equipment losses. Certain losses may not be reported for days or weeks for military intelligence reasons.
Russian Equipment Losses 31/12/2024
🎦 00:29-03:05⏩
Jonathan begins by reviewing the equipment losses from December 31st 2024. He notes that Russian losses (142 personnel) are significantly higher than Ukrainian losses, at a ratio of around 10 to 1. He points out the loss of a Russian Mi-8 helicopter, taken down by an R-73 air-to-air missile launched from an unmanned sea vehicle. He comments that while there are reports that another helicopter was destroyed, there is no visual confirmation. Other Russian losses included a Brem-1 recovery vehicle, drones, a howitzer and several D-30s, many with damaged barrels. Jonathan suspects that the howitzers may have been featured in a Magyar video, speculating that even damaged barrels would render them unusable on the battlefield for a considerable time as repairs are complex. He expresses doubt about the effectiveness of some artillery strikes given the simplicity of a howitzer's design, suggesting that unless ammunition stores are hit, the damage is likely minimal. Four Russian tanks were also destroyed or abandoned on December 31st.
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Russian and Ukrainian Equipment Losses 01/01/2025
🎦 03:05-04:09⏩
Jonathan moves on to the losses from January 1st 2025 describing the Russian losses as "absolutely incredible" and highlighting the sheer volume of vehicles lost. He highlights the disparity between Ukrainian and Russian losses with a rough estimate of 3 or 4 to 1 and comments that in terms of artillery alone, Russia lost more pieces than Ukraine did in total. He suspects that even damaged howitzers would be out of action for a long time due to the complexity of repairs.
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Ukrainian Equipment Losses 01/01/2025
🎦 04:09-05:21⏩
Jonathan turns his attention to Ukrainian losses which he characterises as "nothing too crazy". Losses include an M577 command and control vehicle, a counter-battery radar system, a T-64 tank, four infantry fighting vehicles (including an abandoned Bradley), drone drop mines, four MRAPs, an AEPC, AFV, a couple of IMVs, a couple of BTRs and BRDMs. Jonathan points out that most of these were either Western provided or indigenously produced.
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Russian Equipment Losses 01/01/2025
🎦 05:21-09:11⏩
Jonathan runs through the list of Russian equipment losses, remarking on the "stupendous" volume. These include two Pantsir S1 air defence systems (one destroyed by a Gimlar drone), a damaged Buk air defence system, an electronic warfare system mounted on a truck, a breach-damaged howitzer, a Grad 1 and a BM-21 multiple launch rocket system, a damaged M-46 howitzer, numerous D-30 and other howitzer types. Jonathan observes that most of the artillery pieces are quite old. He also notes the loss of eight tanks (five abandoned, three destroyed) and questions the type and quality of equipment Russia has access to, particularly in light of the use of tanks as glorified APCs. Six infantry fighting vehicles were lost (four BMPs, and a couple of BTRs and BMDs), five generic armoured fighting vehicles (four destroyed), seven APCs (almost all destroyed/abandoned), three MRAPs (unusual for the Russians who don't typically operate many of these). Losses also include a substantial number of trucks, civilian vehicles and ATVs. Jonathan highlights the loss of nine Desert Cross 1000-3 "golf buggies" by Russia as well as quads and another buggy.
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Analysis and Implications of Russian Equipment Losses
🎦 09:11-10:57⏩
Jonathan analyses the long-term implications of the high rate of Russian equipment losses, suggesting that Russia may be facing a shortage of deep reserves and stockpiles. He speculates that Russia might run out of key equipment such as NTLBs and BMPs in the near future, possibly even within the first two quarters of 2025, citing a recent Perun video. He predicts that at some point Russia will be forced to rely solely on newly manufactured BMP-3s as they deplete their reserves of older models and questions whether Ukraine would be willing to see the war end before Russia has to confront these serious equipment shortages.
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Wrap up
🎦 10:57-11:00⏩
Jonathan concludes the video by reiterating that both December 31st and January 1st saw "exceptionally good ratios" for Ukraine in terms of equipment losses, describing this as "really, really good news". He thanks viewers for watching and signs off.
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