Ukraine War Upd. EXTRA: Tochnyi Show on Drone Stats & Tech

"Everything can be taken from a human being but one thing, the last of the human freedoms - to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances."

Hello Team

🎦 00:00-01:09⏩

Jonathan welcomes viewers to a "Ukraine war update extra" video - an extract from the Tochnyi video stream. He explains that he has cut the usual news part of the video as viewers have already seen it on his own channel. He also encourages viewers to subscribe to the Tochnyi channel and mentions some of the contributors to the channel.

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Introducing Jonathan MS Pearce to Tochnyi

🎦 01:09-01:37⏩

Jonathan is introduced to the Tochnyi show by a host who explains that Jonathan runs the YouTube channel ATP Geopolitics and is a columnist for Only Sky and a public speaker. The host explains that Jonathan was interested in a Twitter thread by Daniele on FPV drones and had subsequently made some comments on that and also made a follow-up video about the thread. He also mentions that Daniele is a member of the Tochnyi team and that Andrew Perpetua, who is also involved in the Tochnyi team, is an associate of the channel.

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Jonathan's Background

🎦 01:37-05:14⏩

Jonathan explains his background as a philosopher of religion, and how his interest in philosophy helps him to understand geopolitics. He discusses the importance of psychology and truth in the context of understanding global events. Jonathan says he had already been writing about politics in his column for Only Sky when the war started, which immediately captivated him. He explains that the moral dimension of the war is what draws him to it, and how he finds it "so unbelievably unfair". He explains that he started making videos on his philosophical blog about the war, which led to a large audience and the creation of his channel, ATP Geopolitics.

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Disinformation and Misinformation

🎦 06:10-09:01⏩

Jonathan discusses the importance of tackling disinformation and misinformation, and introduces the term "epistemic security", which he explains as security concerning truth and knowledge. He argues that the internet and social media have made it easier for bad actors to manipulate and spread misinformation, and that this is incredibly dangerous for everyone. He states that if Russia had been "sensible" about their goals, they would have avoided invading Ukraine and invested in disinformation campaigns instead. He highlights the importance of accuracy and objectivity in his work, while acknowledging that he is clearly pro-Ukrainian. He also emphasizes the need to be aware of cognitive biases, specifically confirmation bias, and how it can lead to an inaccurate understanding of events. He cautions viewers to be skeptical of information and to always question their own beliefs.

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Confirmation Bias and Epistemic Humility

🎦 09:01-12:36⏩

Jonathan further explores the topic of confirmation bias and the importance of being aware of it in the context of consuming and sharing information. He discusses the Gerasimov rumour as an example, emphasising the importance of verifying information, checking sources and being cautious about jumping to conclusions. He highlights the need for "epistemic humility" and the importance of acknowledging when one is wrong. He believes that it is important to learn from mistakes and to be willing to change one's opinion when presented with strong evidence. Jonathan encourages viewers to engage with his content in a good faith manner and to challenge his arguments with rational evidence.

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Misinformation in the UK

🎦 12:36-16:32⏩

Jonathan reflects on the spread of misinformation in the UK and how it affects people's perceptions of the war. He acknowledges that mainstream media often faces regulations and standards that social media platforms like Twitter and YouTube do not. He notes that social media makes it easier for people to spread misinformation, and gives an example of a friend who shared Kremlin talking points after listening to Peter Hitchens. He believes that certain individuals in the media are more susceptible to spreading Russian propaganda because of their political leanings or their opposition to the West. He argues that everyone is susceptible to misinformation because of the accessibility of information on social media, and that it is important to be critical of the content we consume. Jonathan also mentions the issue of "false balance" in mainstream media, where they present two opposing viewpoints equally even when one is nonsensical.

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FPV Drones in the Ukraine War

🎦 16:32-18:27⏩

Jonathan transitions the conversation to FPV drones and how their use in the Ukraine war has brought the conflict closer to home. He explains that there has been a lot of discussion about the effectiveness of FPV drones, and how they have impacted viewers' understanding of the war. He notes that their use has become a mystery because it is difficult to analyze their capabilities.

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Daniele's Thread and Initial Analysis

🎦 18:27-22:56⏩

Daniele, a member of the Tochnyi team, explains his motivation for analyzing the data on FPV drone usage. He was initially inspired by claims that Russia was outproducing Ukraine in drone production, and questioned why they were still procuring drones from China if they were producing such large quantities domestically. He decided to analyze the data from Andrew Perpetua's Twitter thread and, with Andrew's help, discovered a "small treasure" of information. He highlights the value of Andrew's work in providing raw data and emphasises that the information is still a work in progress, acknowledging that data is always subject to change. He encourages feedback on his work and stresses the importance of the scientific method and evidence-based decision-making in understanding and responding to complex issues.

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Andrew Perpetua's Analysis

🎦 22:56-26:24⏩

Andrew Perpetua, a contributor to the Tochnyi team, takes on the role of answering a series of questions posed by Erland, who outlines 10 questions that are key to understanding the effectiveness of drones in the war. Andrew's analysis begins by suggesting that Russia is likely producing more drones than Ukraine, but it is difficult to say definitively. He also states that Ukraine has a more varied and high-tech approach to civilian-built drones, but that Russian drones are vastly more capable and technologically advanced. He suggests that the disparity is likely due to greater military funding for Russian drone programs, which has resulted in access to better components and technological expertise. Andrew mentions that Russian drones are significantly more expensive than standard drones and notes that they are not often seen in open source videos, but when they are, they are unsettling due to their capabilities. He suggests that Russian drones are significantly more expensive than standard drones and notes that they are not often seen in open source videos, but when they are, they are unsettling due to their capabilities.

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Comparing Ukrainian and Russian Drone Capabilities

🎦 26:24-28:34⏩

Andrew continues his analysis, emphasizing that Russian drones have superior thermal cameras and digital connections, and are more resistant to electronic warfare. He highlights the significant difference in the quality of thermal drones between the two sides, explaining that while Ukrainian thermal drones are useful, they lack the clarity and depth perception of their Russian counterparts. This limits Ukraine's ability to move at night, which is a critical factor in their operations. He also notes that Russian drones are more effectively used in targeting trenches and dugouts, which he attributes to their superior capabilities. Andrew suggests that the extensive use of drones in targeting dugouts may indicate a shortage of artillery ammunition, although he does not believe this to be the case. He argues that drones are more efficient in targeting fortified positions like bunkers.

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Intelligence and Communication

🎦 28:34-33:35⏩

The discussion shifts to the importance of intelligence and communication in drone operations. Andrew asserts that Ukraine has poor intelligence capabilities and that they are not effective at communicating between drone units, resulting in inefficient drone usage and redundant efforts. He shares examples of Ukrainian drone units deploying multiple drones on the same target, which could have been avoided with better communication and coordination. He also mentions that intercepts have indicated a lack of communication between Russian units, suggesting that communication challenges exist on both sides. He emphasizes that communication between drone units is crucial, as they may not necessarily be part of the same brigade.

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Assessing Russian Drone Production Claims

🎦 33:35-43:15⏩

Jonathan summarises the key question at hand: whether Russia's claim of producing 300,000 drones a month is credible. He reviews the analysis of Daniele's thread and Andrew's observations, which suggest that Ukraine's drone usage is more focused on vehicles and equipment, while Russia's strikes appear to be more heavily focused on trenches and dugouts. This leads to a discussion about whether the difference in strike targets is due to a shortage of vehicles for the Russians to target or whether it reflects a difference in tactics. Jonathan, drawing on the analysis of Daniele and Andrew's work, suggests that there may be a parity between Russian and Ukrainian drone production, despite Russia's claims of significantly higher output. He argues that the difference in targets and strikes could be attributed to a strategic choice by Russia, potentially reflecting a need to focus on entrenched positions.

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Dissecting Daniele's Data

🎦 43:15-48:19⏩

Daniele explains the data he used in his analysis, which was based on Andrew's ongoing database. The database includes various details about drone strikes, such as geographical coordinates, type of attack, source of information and a description of the target. He emphasizes that the database is constantly updated and that it is vital to recognize that information may change. Daniele also addresses some of Jonathan's questions about the analysis, noting that while there are gaps in the data, those gaps are likely due to operational factors and not a lack of drone availability. He suggests that the missing data could be attributed to drone strikes on buildings, which are not consistently documented. He shares his efforts to visualize the data on a map, with the aim of understanding which areas are most affected by FPV drone strikes. He also discusses the ongoing nature of the project, emphasizing that his work is just a starting point and that further analysis is required.

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Comparing Russian and Ukrainian Drone Production

🎦 48:19-55:27⏩

Jonathan highlights the importance of Daniele's analysis, particularly the comparison of vehicle strikes by Russia and Ukraine. He suggests that if the figures for infantry strikes are roughly equal and Ukraine's claimed production of 50,000 drones per month is accurate, then the difference in vehicle strikes could suggest a parity in drone production between the two sides. He argues that the extensive use of drones by Russia in targeting dugouts, as observed by Andrew, could be explained by a lack of available vehicles for them to target. This would suggest that both sides have a similar level of drone production and that the apparent difference in usage is driven by tactical choices.

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Russian Drone Production and Quality

🎦 55:27-1:00⏩
:47
Daniele expands on his analysis, highlighting the possible reasons for the gap in the data. He explains that the drones are not being stored in warehouses but are being actively used, and that the simple but effective nature of the drones means they are readily deployed. He argues that the missing data is likely due to a lack of available information about strikes on dugouts and other structures. He emphasizes that the focus of the analysis is on the usage of drones, not necessarily their effectiveness, and that the data for December includes only successful hits, not all the drones deployed. He also discusses the issue of data sources and the challenge of determining whether a target has been struck multiple times, particularly in the case of buildings.

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Chinese Support for Russia's Drone Program

🎦 1:00:47-1:01⏩
:47⏩
The conversation shifts to Chinese support for Russia's drone program. Andrew confirms that many of the components used in FPV drones are made in China, suggesting that Russia has access to those components through both official and unofficial channels. He acknowledges that the extent to which the Chinese government is actively pushing components to Russia is debatable, but he notes that the appearance of drones produced in China is a direct sign of Chinese support. He expresses concern about the potential for China to increase its support to Russia in the future.

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The Need for International Support for Ukraine's Drone Program

🎦 1:01:47-1:03⏩
:57⏩
Jonathan argues that the European Union should take steps to support Ukraine's drone program, not just through sanctions but also through direct production assistance. He mentions that Ukraine has been requesting support for some time and that there are already groups helping them, but that greater governmental support is needed. He estimates that Ukraine needs $2 billion to complete its drone program, which he believes is a reasonable sum given the amount of money already invested in Ukraine. He also highlights the need for Ukraine to have access to large quantities of drones, which would require placing purchase orders that can attract manufacturers willing to scale up production.

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Analysis of Russian-Made Drones

🎦 1:03:57-1:06⏩
:33⏩
Daniele discusses the use of aluminium in Russian-made drones, suggesting that this could be a sign of their limited access to more sophisticated materials. He notes that this approach may be intended to create a more durable and stiff structure to support more powerful engines and larger payloads. He also expresses some uncertainty about the purpose behind the design choice. He addresses concerns about the serial numbers on the drones, stating that they are likely not representative of a sophisticated production process and are more likely used for tracking and accounting purposes. He also addresses concerns about the serial numbers on the drones, stating that they are likely not representative of a sophisticated production process and are more likely used for tracking and accounting purposes.

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Russian Propaganda and Ukrainian Drone Production

🎦 1:06:33-1:07⏩
:35⏩
Jonathan shares an article about a Russian propaganda report claiming that only 10% of Ukrainian FPV drones reach their target. He suggests that if this is true, then Ukraine must have a far larger number of drones than initially thought. He believes that this claim could be a way of downplaying the effectiveness of Ukraine's drone program, which would be counterproductive for Russia.

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Shortage of Munitions for FPV Drones

🎦 1:07:35-1:08⏩
:47⏩
The discussion returns to the issue of ammunition for FPV drones. Andrew confirms that there is a shortage of fuses for Ukraine, which he attributes to the difficulty of designing reliable and safe fuses. He explains that the shortage is more acute for larger quadrones that drop munitions, as opposed to FPV kamikaze drones, which typically use RPG rounds or plastic explosives. He highlights the lack of mass-produced, purpose-built munitions for FPV drones as a major concern and expresses hope that governments will address this issue. He notes that neither the Ukrainian nor the American government has shown much interest in producing such munitions, which he finds frustrating.

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Availability of RPG Warheads

🎦 1:08:47-1:09⏩
:59⏩
Jonathan mentions that there was a report earlier in the war that Ukraine had 10,000 RPG warheads readily available. He believes that this would be a readily available munition globally and that Ukraine should be able to secure a large supply. He also notes that RPG warheads are not the only option for FPV drones and that plastic explosives can be used effectively. He highlights that the RPG warhead is often favoured for its ability to penetrate armour. Jonathan also shares a video of a Ukrainian FPV drone detonating in mid-air with fragmentation rounds, suggesting that Ukraine has been using this type of munition more frequently.

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Airburst Munitions and Dive Bombers

🎦 1:09:59-1:10⏩
:43⏩
The discussion turns to airburst munitions and dive bombers. Jonathan shares a video of the cardboard drone using airburst munitions and notes that it is a capability that has been seen before, but that it is not widely used. He suggests that the experiment with airburst drones might have failed due to reliability issues. He notes that dive bombers are still used, but less frequently than before, and that they are now primarily used against infantry. He recalls the use of dive bombers by the 82nd Brigade in the attack on Verbova and by Madyar in the attack on Staromorsk.

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German Aid Updates

🎦 1:10:43-1:16⏩
:18⏩
Erland, from Tochnyi, introduces a segment on German aid to Ukraine. He reports that Germany is set to directly start supplying Ukraine with Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks, citing a letter from Sebastian Schäfer of the German Bundestag. He also mentions that the repair of Ukrainian Stridsvagen 122 and Leopard 2A6 tanks in Lithuania is taking longer than expected due to a lack of spare parts. He highlights that Rheinmetall has confirmed that a comprehensive spare parts package for Leopard 2A6 tanks was ordered by the German government in December 2023, and that a contract has been signed between Rheinmetall and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to improve the supply of spare parts. He also shares updates on the production capacity for German air defense systems, which he suggests is currently limited.

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Recent German Military Aid to Ukraine

🎦 1:16:18-1:16⏩
:43⏩
Erland continues with a detailed list of recent military aid provided by Germany to Ukraine, including: 10 Marder 1A3 IFVs, up to 120 IRIS-TSL missiles, one Skynex air defense system, two TRML-4D surveillance radars, 30 drone detection sensors, one bridge-laying tank Biber, three HX81 tank transporters, one extra semi-trailer, 10 Mercedes-Benz Zetros, two VS and one MC mine-clearing tanks, 34 regular vehicles (potentially Toyota Land Cruisers), more than 9,155 artillery shells, ammunition for Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks, 3,350 combat helmets, 10 ground surveillance radars, 305 MK-556 rifles, 750,000 rounds of firearm ammunition, 1,152 winter camouflage nets, and 2,000 winter camouflage ponchos.

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German Aid to Ukraine: Non-Military Assistance

🎦 1:16:43-1:17⏩
:05⏩
Erland reports that the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has co-financed seven diesel generators, which have been donated to the water utility in Kharkiv to help ensure access to safe water for around 220,000 people. He also mentions that Deer Defense has taken over Allweier, a manufacturer of precision parts in Germany, which is significant for the supply of parts for IRIS-T and IRIS-TSL missiles and systems delivered by Germany to Ukraine.

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Recognising German Aid's Value

🎦 1:17:05-1:17⏩
:42⏩
Erland expresses his appreciation for German Aid's contributions to Ukraine, highlighting the importance of his work in keeping Germany accountable for its support. He commends German Aid's website and blog as valuable resources, suggesting that he would spend more time on them if he had the time. He also mentions that German Aid is currently working on a new version of his website.

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Russian Cluster Munitions in Ballistic Missiles

🎦 1:17:42-1:19⏩
:18⏩
Erland raises a question from Kellen Dunn about the use of cluster munitions in Russian ballistic missiles. He confirms that this is not a new capability and that Iskander and possibly Tochka missiles have cluster munition payloads. He also mentions that Andrew Perpetua and others may have more specific information about the prevalence of cluster munition payloads in the battlefield.

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Kharkiv Bombardment

🎦 1:19:18-1:19⏩
:24⏩
Jonathan mentions that Kharkiv has been bombarded by S-300 missiles while they are streaming the show, commenting that this is a common occurrence during their broadcasts. He expresses his concern about the ongoing attacks.

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The Effectiveness of the Skynex Air Defense System

🎦 1:19:24-1:21⏩
:26⏩
Erland poses a question about the effectiveness of the Skynex air defense system, which Germany has delivered to Ukraine. He compares it to other air defense systems like Gepard, Stinger missiles and ZU autocannons. He suggests that Skynex is more modern and effective, comparing it to four Gepards combined, but with less maneuverability and armour. He explains that it is automated and can target drones and other air threats, requiring a crew of four people. He also notes that the system is not fully automatic and still requires a human operator to give the fire command.

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Ukraine's Air Defense Missile Situation

🎦 1:21:26-1:25⏩
:09⏩
Erland asks Colby about the availability of air defense missiles for Ukraine and the challenges they face in the future. Colby outlines the key systems Ukraine is relying on, including NASAMS and IRIS-T. He notes that IRIS-T missiles are only produced in Germany, creating a single source dependency. While he acknowledges Germany's efforts to increase production, he believes that the single-source reliance is problematic. He explains that NASAMS uses AMRAAM missiles, which have a broader production base, but that Ukraine's reliance on the United States for NASAMS and AMRAAM creates a challenge if the United States were to stop providing aid. He highlights the importance of European nations investing in their own defense production capabilities, noting that while some progress has been made, more investments are needed. He expresses concern about the potential for a severe shortage of munitions for Ukraine if the United States were to withdraw support.

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European Nations Lagging Behind in Defense Production

🎦 1:25:09-1:30⏩
:05⏩
Jonathan asks Colby to identify the European nations lagging behind in defense production. Colby points out that Norway is a significant producer of ammunition and that their investment in production capacity has been insufficient. He also mentions Nexter and KNDS in France as being relatively modest in their expansion efforts. He highlights the need for France to restart production of new SCALP EG missiles, which he believes should have been done immediately. He argues that this lack of investment is a significant failure of European governments, as manufacturers will not produce products without orders. Colby emphasizes that governments need to place orders to support the expansion of production capabilities in the defense industry. He also shares insights on the Canadian defense industry, which is also seeking orders for production.

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Italy's Defense Production Situation

🎦 1:30:05-1:34⏩
:01⏩
Jonathan brings up Italy's defense production situation, noting that their contribution to Ukraine is somewhat unclear due to a lack of transparency. He mentions that Rheinmetall has a facility in Italy that is producing ammunition and that Italy has state-owned facilities as well. He highlights the lack of clear information about what Italy is doing to expand its own production capacity. While he acknowledges Giorgia Meloni's comments about supporting Ukraine, he is unsure whether the Italian government has actually taken concrete steps to increase production.

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Norway's Defense Production and Investment

🎦 1:34:01-1:37⏩
:02⏩
Erland shares information about Norway's defense production, specifically focusing on NAMO, a major ammunition producer. He reveals that NAMO has indicated that they are only one of four major ammunition producers in Europe with a market share of 20-25%. He also notes that NAMO's production capacity is estimated at a maximum of 500,000 shells per year, which is insufficient to meet current demand. He describes the bureaucratic process involved in securing funding for NAMO to double its production capacity and how it led to a large contract awarded by the Norwegian government. Erland argues that the bureaucratic process was too slow and that the Norwegian government should have acted more quickly to invest in NAMO's production capacity.

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UK and Italy's Defense Production

🎦 1:37:02-1:40⏩
:45⏩
Daniele shifts the focus to the UK's defense production situation, specifically BAE Systems, and shares positive news about their efforts. He notes that BAE received significant funding from the UK government to increase production capacity, particularly at their Washington plant, which manufactures a range of ammunition. He highlights the plant's expansion efforts, including increasing employee numbers and production capacity. He also points out that the plant is one of the largest in Europe. Daniele contrasts BAE's positive performance with the situation in Italy, which he describes as the "black sheep" of the defense production effort. He explains that while Italy has a long history of ammunition production, their factories, particularly the large plant in Sardinia, are currently not producing new ammunition at the level they could. He highlights that Italy has been grappling with protests against ammunition production and that efforts to expand capacity in Sardinia were halted in 2014 due to local concerns about peace and environmental issues. Daniele attributes the lack of progress in Italy to political complexities and the difficulty of securing approval for expansion plans. He concludes that it is unlikely that Italy will step up its ammunition production in the near future.

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German Defense Production and Historical Context

🎦 1:40:45-1:42⏩
:02⏩
Jonathan expresses his appreciation for Germany's efforts to support Ukraine, acknowledging that they have made significant progress. He highlights the importance of Germany's role in supporting Ukraine's defense and argues that this period could be seen as a turning point in German history. He acknowledges that Germany's defense production capabilities have been lacking, but he attributes this to the focus on countering terrorism in recent years. He believes that Germany needs to adjust its defense strategy and invest more in high-intensity warfare capabilities. He also notes that Germany has invested in research and development in areas like MRAP vehicles and mine-blast resistance, which have proven to be valuable in Ukraine.

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Role of Small and Medium-Sized Companies in Defense Production

🎦 1:42:02-1:46⏩
:13⏩
Jonathan raises a question about the role of small and medium-sized companies in Germany's defense production effort, highlighting that Germany has a long tradition of strong small and medium-sized enterprises. He believes that these companies could play a more significant role in supporting Ukraine, particularly in the production of components and parts. He suggests that Germany could learn from Russia's reliance on civilian industries for defense production and explore ways to leverage its own small and medium-sized businesses to support the war effort. He also shares a news report about a fireworks factory explosion in Moscow, which he believes may have exposed the use of civilian industries for defense production in Russia. He suggests that Germany could consider transitioning to a "war economy" and more actively engage its civilian industries in defense production.

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German Defense Production: A Perspective from German Aid

🎦 1:46:13-1:46⏩
:18⏩
German Aid responds to Jonathan's question about the role of small and medium-sized companies in German defense production. He acknowledges that the question is interesting and that the answer depends on the definition of "small" and "medium-sized". He notes that Germany has a strong defense sector with many small and medium-sized companies that have international customers.

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German Defense Production: Examples of Small and Medium-Sized Companies

🎦 1:46:18-1:46⏩
:57⏩
German Aid continues his answer, citing Quantum Systems as an example of a small company that has provided aid to Ukraine through the delivery of Vector UAVs. He acknowledges that Germany's defense industry is heavily focused on air defense, armored vehicles and ammunition, which are primarily produced by large companies like Rheinmetall, KMW, Diehl Defense and SAAB. He believes that small and medium-sized companies play a role in the drone sector but not necessarily in other areas of defense production.

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Accessing Andrew's Database

🎦 1:46:57-1:52⏩
:21⏩
Daniele shares a glimpse into the complexity of Andrew's database. He explains that Andrew has been building a spreadsheet for almost two years that contains detailed information about drone strikes. He emphasizes the comprehensive nature of the database and the extensive work that Andrew has put into it. Daniele shares his efforts to visualize the data on a map and to create a tool that allows users to easily navigate and filter the database. He acknowledges the challenges involved in accessing and processing the data, which requires significant time and effort. He highlights the value of the database as a resource for understanding the war and the impact of drone strikes.

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Wrap up

🎦 1:52:21-1:54⏩
:58⏩
The show concludes with thanks to the panelists for their contributions to the discussion. Erland reminds viewers to submit questions via DM, reply to posts on X, or visit the website. He introduces the Picture of the Week, which will be described for podcast listeners. He quotes Viktor Frankl, "Everything can be taken from a human being but one thing, the last of the human freedoms - to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances." He reflects on the images of Ukrainian POWs and notes that they are a testament to the Russian culture and the ongoing war. He concludes the show with a message of support for Ukraine.

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