Ukraine War Upd. EXTRA: If the Counteroffensive Was a Failure, Then...

"If you are someone pro-Russian, pro-Kremlin voice who is going to shout about the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive then you have to own up the abject failure of the Russian offensive. It's that simple."

Hello Team

🎦 00:00-00:18⏩

Jonathan Pearce welcomes viewers to an "extra nuggets and tidbits" episode focusing on the logic surrounding the Ukrainian counter-offensive and whether it can be considered a failure.

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Was the Ukrainian Counteroffensive a Failure?

🎦 00:18-06:42⏩

• Jonathan argues that while the counter-offensive might be perceived as a failure due to its initial objectives not being met, this perspective is flawed.
• He reminds viewers that the Ukrainians initially aimed to launch the offensive in early spring 2023 but were delayed due to lack of equipment, such as Abrams tanks and A-TACMs, which arrived after the counteroffensive.
• The Ukrainians faced significant challenges early on, particularly in places like Robotina where they suffered losses of equipment including Bradleys, Leopards, and Mine Rollers. This forced a change in tactics less than a week in.
• The initial plan involved a rapid advance towards the Sea of Azov, cutting off the land bridge to Crimea, followed by a pincer movement with a second force crossing the Dnipro River. However, this plan proved unfeasible due to strong Russian fortifications, minefields, ATGM crews, artillery barrages, and Ka-52 attack helicopters.
• Despite this, Jonathan argues that the Ukrainians adapted and found success in other areas. They effectively degraded Russian equipment, targeted logistics, struck the Russian Navy in Sevastopol, and took out airbases. This forced the Black Sea Fleet to relocate from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.
• Jonathan emphasizes that judging the counteroffensive solely on its initial goals is shortsighted, as the Ukrainians adapted and achieved significant successes in other areas.

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Comparing to the Initial Russian Offensive

🎦 06:42-13:05⏩

• Transitioning from the Ukrainian counter-offensive, Jonathan delves into the initial Russian offensive using maps (crediting JR for their creation).
• He highlights an article he wrote in March 2022, a month into the war, titled "Even I Knew More Than Russian Intelligence Services Assessing Putin’s Plans”. He emphasizes how even he, from his home, had a better grasp of the situation than Putin, illustrating the failures in Russian intelligence.
• Examining the maps, he shows the initial Russian advance in early March 2022, capturing areas like Kherson and moving towards Mykolaiv, Krivyi Rih, and Zaporizhzhia. While they made gains in the Luhansk Oblast, control was debatable as they mostly held roads.
• He points out the encirclement of cities like Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kyiv, demonstrating the initial Russian objective to capture the entire country.
• However, within weeks, the Russians were forced to retreat from areas around Kyiv and Kharkiv, demonstrating their failure to achieve their initial goals.
• He argues that the scale of the Russian retreat, equipment losses, and shift in objectives were far more significant than the setbacks faced by the Ukrainians.

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The Logic of Failure – A Philosophical Perspective

🎦 13:05-18:05⏩

• Jonathan criticizes the hypocrisy of pro-Kremlin voices that condemn the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a failure while ignoring the shortcomings of the Russian offensive.
• He uses a syllogism to illustrate his point:
  • If Ukraine not initially achieving its military goal and having to adapt its metrics for success equals failure (A=B),
  • And Russia not initially achieving its military goal and having to adapt its metrics for success is equivalent to Ukraine's situation (C=A),
  • Then, Russia not initially achieving its military goal and adapting its metrics for success also equals failure (C=B).
• He further explains the concept of transitive logic, stating that if a relationship holds true between elements A and B, and the same relationship applies between B and C, then it also holds true between A and C.
• Jonathan concludes that judging both offensives based on similar criteria means accepting that if the Ukrainian counter-offensive was a failure, the Russian offensive and the entire war effort represent a much larger failure for Russia.

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Wrap up

🎦 18:05-18:46⏩

• Jonathan encourages his viewers to challenge the narrative of those who call the Ukrainian counter-offensive a failure without acknowledging the greater failure of the Russian invasion. He suggests using his logic-based argument to highlight the hypocrisy in such claims.
• After a humorous remark about the video's length, he concludes the video.

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