Ukraine Conflict: Full Frontline Update
Table of Contents 📖
"The sign of insanity is doing the same thing again and again expecting different results"
Hello Team
🎦 00:00-00:48⏩
Jonathan forgot to mention in his previous video about military aid that Germany are giving another Patriot battery to Ukraine, possibly a fourth. This is in addition to components for one Patriot system (two launches) being donated by the Netherlands, and a launch from the USA. The New York Times reports (citing sources) that the Biden administration has approved the delivery of a Patriot system, currently in Poland, to Ukraine. This will be the second Patriot supplied by the USA. The total number of Patriots for Ukraine from Germany will be 4 if this goes ahead. The USA have already provided 2, and the Netherlands 1. The Netherlands have also provided 2 extra launches, and together with the radar they are donating, will have donated 5 in total. France and Italy will jointly donate a SAMP/T system, and Italy will reportedly send another, which are equivalent to the Patriot system. Jonathan is unclear on the exact difference, but believes the SAMP/T is better in some areas than the Patriot, but not as good in others. Ukraine will have between 8 and 9 Patriot and SAMP/T batteries, enough to protect Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, two F-16 bases and an area at the front. At least 6-7 more systems are needed to effectively protect the whole country. Ideally 15-16 Patriots or SAMP/T batteries would be required in total. Ukraine may need to buy another system with the money they are receiving, but Jonathan explains there may be issues with this if the money they have is ringfenced for purchases from particular countries.
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📍 FRONT-LINE UPDATE -🗺️ MAP LEGEND
Frontline Overview
🎦 02:36-03:02⏩
Jonathan states there is very little change to report on the frontline. The Ukraine Battle Map is the source for this section of the update.
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Frontline Mapping Sources
🎦 02:45-03:36⏩
Jonathan explains that Surret Maps have not updated their maps since 4th June, so he has not been able to include their maps on his overview, which is a synthesis of different mappers. The Russian frontline is therefore not shown. The frontline update uses maps from Andrew Perpetua and Deep State Maps.
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Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna Frontline
🎦 03:36-04:12⏩
No change.
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Siversk Frontline
🎦 03:42-04:12⏩
, 06:17-06:19⏩
No change, although the ISW reports that Russian forces claim to have made some gains around the chalk pit area but this has not been confirmed. The ISW also report that geolocated footage from 10th June shows that Ukrainian forces have regained positions along the Lypsy-Kharkiv road. Jonathan concludes that the Russians are not doing very well in these two sectors, and it seems that fighting has mostly stopped.
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Lypsy-Kharkiv Road Geolocated Footage
🎦 04:19-06:12⏩
Jonathan displays a map from 'War Monitor' showing the location of Lypsy. Russians are attacking in two separate areas in the Kharkiv direction. Ukrainian forces have been attacking to try and gain ground and therefore the ability to fire artillery at Kharkiv, but this does not appear to be the case now. Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces are attacking motorised rifle units south of Ryabok and landing at a position on the Lypsy-Pilnaya highway. The Ukrainians are being shelled by Russian forces in the area. Jonathan adds this to his frontline map. The location is in Andrew Perpetua's grey zone, and not quite at the Russian defensive line. Jonathan concludes that this confirms the information given by the mappers, as he would expect Ukrainian troops to be landing in the grey zone, and trying to push into Russian controlled areas from there.
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Bakhmut Frontline
🎦 06:19-08:08⏩
No change to the Bakhmut frontline. There are three main points of focus:
- Bodonivka to Kalynivka axis.
- The canal microdistrict.
- Along the T-0504 highway that runs through Ivanovske.
Russian forces are pressing in all three places, and have had some success moving through the canal microdistrict. Both Deep State Maps and Andrew Perpetua agree that Ukrainian forces have been pushed to the outskirts of the area, but it does not appear that they have been pushed to the other side of the canal. The ISW reports that a Ukrainian spokesperson has stated that Russian forces are not operating in Chasiv Yar yet, but are continuing to try and advance in the canal and Novi microdistricts in eastern Chasiv Yar. Russian milbloggers are claiming that a large area of the canal microdistrict has been taken, and that fighting continues in the western part of the area. However, the ISW state that they have not seen evidence of further Russian advances. Jonathan points out the Novi microdistrict on the map, and says that attacks across the canal on foot through the wooded area have been unsuccessful as the terrain is difficult and it is not possible to use mechanised equipment. This makes it much harder for the attacking forces.
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Avdiivka Frontline
🎦 08:09-08:54⏩
Deep State Maps have aligned their map with Andriy Perpetua to the south west of Ocheretyne. Russian forces have been pushing the Ukrainians back towards Sukhyi Stavok, but there is nothing to add from the ISW report. Deep State Maps report that Ukrainian forces have been pushed to the outskirts of Novobakhmutivka on the way to Novoselivka Druha in the direction of Krasnohorivka. There have been slight gains for the Russians in this area.
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Overall Frontline Assessment
🎦 08:54-10:32⏩
Jonathan questions whether the lack of movement on the frontline indicates that the Russians have culminated. He feels that whilst they are still pushing and taking villages, it seems they do not have much left to give in terms of a major offensive. He made similar observations last year, prior to the Ukrainian counter-offensive, when everyone was expecting more from the Russians, but it never happened. He believes it will be difficult for either side to make significant gains in terms of retaking territory using large numbers of troops and equipment as long as the defenders are properly equipped. He caveats this with the observation that minefields would change this assessment.
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Artillery Losses
🎦 10:34-14:23⏩
Jonathan refers to data collated by 'Dell' showing Russian artillery losses over time. He compares losses since the failure at Mala Tokmachka with the same time period the previous year. Jonathan highlights the huge losses the Ukrainians inflicted on Russian artillery after Mala Tokmachka when they realised they needed to counter the threat if they were to be successful in any future counter offensives. There is a marked difference in the density of the statistics which he attributes to Ukrainian use of first person view drones. He notes that the Russians are currently taking heavier losses than ever before.
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Potential for Ukrainian Counter Offensive
🎦 14:23-18:13⏩
Jonathan believes that because of these equipment losses, and the general degradation of the Russian forces through attrition, if Ukraine were to attack in the same area as before (Robotyne is given as an example), the outcome could be very different. There may be fewer mines, and the Russian troops may be less well-equipped, experienced and trained. Additionally, the arrival of Storm Shadow missiles, and the redeployment of Russian helicopters (after suffering losses to Ukrainian air defences), could make a significant difference to the outcome. Jonathan refers to 'Dell's' data again, this time focussing on losses of Russian air defence systems. He explains that the Ukrainians have been systematically targeting air defences since their failed counter-offensive, and the impact of this can be seen in the data, particularly if the density of the statistics is compared with the same time period the previous year. This ability to counter Russian air defences will be important to the success of any future Ukrainian counter-offensive, if it allows them to use F16s and Mirage jets to support their ground troops. Jonathan concludes that with additional equipment such as Bradley fighting vehicles, and their own domestically produced equipment, the only issue for the Ukrainians in terms of mounting a large-scale counter-offensive is a lack of manpower. This could be resolved by waiting until 2025, and continuing to attrit Russian forces and equipment in the meantime. The current situation is challenging for the Russians.
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ISW Report - Robotyne
🎦 18:14-20:51⏩
The ISW reports that Russian forces are unable to carry out any significant ground assaults around Robotyne due to extensive Ukrainian drone use, which allows a high degree of visibility on the battlefield. A Ukrainian volunteer spokesperson describes the Russian operations in the area as not being tactically or operationally decisive. The suggestion is that the activity is to demonstrate some kind of victory on the battlefield for informational purposes rather than to make meaningful physical gains. Russian sources familiar with the area have also complained about the impact of Ukrainian drone activity. Jonathan highlights two things:
- This is another example of how Ukrainian forces appear to have the upper hand when it comes to drone warfare.
- The Russian activity in the area is not significant from a tactical or operational perspective.
Jonathan suspects that the Russians just want to be able to say they have troops in Robotyne rather than having any realistic military objective.
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Kharkiv and the Impact of the Russian Offensive on Restrictions
🎦 20:57-22:45⏩
Jonathan uses the example of the Russian offensive on Kharkiv to illustrate how an ill-thought-out course of action can have unintended consequences. He explains that if the Russians had used the 50,000 troops they had available to reinforce their existing positions, instead of attacking Kharkiv, it could have made a big difference to their fortunes. The attack on Kharkiv, whilst it did cause significant damage, backfired because it led to a change in the restrictions on which targets HIMARS and other systems could engage. This has allowed the Ukrainians to degrade Russia's ability to strike Kharkiv with S300s from Belgorod to the point where they are no longer a threat. Whilst this is obviously a positive outcome for the Ukrainians, it's a blow to the Russians. Jonathan believes that if they had not attacked Kharkiv, and had instead reinforced their lines as he had suggested at the time, the outcome may have been very different for them.
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Wrap up
🎦 22:45-22:52⏩
Jonathan thanks viewers for watching, and asks them to like, subscribe and share.
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