What Russia Got Wrong
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"The corruption in the Russian army has basically meant that any reforms didn't achieve the reforms that they wanted to in the ways that they were hoping."
Hello Team!
Jonathan introduces this as a Ukraine War Update Extra video. He has split a longer 50 minute recording into two parts. This part will cover an article from Foreign Affairs by Dara Massicot that provides an excellent analysis of the failures and limited successes of the Russian military in the war so far.
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Russia's pre-war military advantages
- Before the invasion, Russia's military was larger and better equipped than Ukraine's
- Russian forces had more combat experience
- Most analysts assumed if Russia used its advantages wisely, Ukraine could not withstand the attack for long
Excessive secrecy undermined Russia
- Only top military and political leaders knew about invasion plans until days before
- Many troops thought they were on a training exercise when captured as POWs in first weeks
- Lower-level commanders lacked strategic understanding, making them less effective
- Secrecy led to invasion plan riddled with faulty assumptions and planning errors
Russia's military can adapt and sustain high intensity
- Russian military learned from mistakes and made adjustments like mobilizing personnel
- Used electronic warfare to jam Ukrainian communications
- Operated with more consistency after shifting to defensive in late 2022
- Can sustain higher combat intensity than most militaries, firing 20,000 artillery rounds per day in December (dropped to 5,000 in early 2023 according to CNN)
Corruption undermined Russian military reforms
- Corruption endemic in Russian military and cannot be overstated
- Reforms in 1990s aimed to restructure force and allocate funds for modernization
- But corruption meant money disappeared and upgrades didn't happen as claimed
- Resulted in rotten army severely underfunded despite claims otherwise
- Shoigu declared 70% of equipment new or modernized by 2020 but not the case in reality
Lack of unified command and faulty assumptions
- Russia lacked unified operational command for months, unlike in Syria and 2014 Ukraine
- Different units (army, Rosgvardia, DPR/LPR militias, Wagner) operated separately without coordination
- Russia trying to integrate forces now, one year late
- Many units understaffed, modern equipment underperformed due to personnel shortages
- Based on faulty assumption of quick victory, Russia didn't execute normal war doctrine of weeks of strikes to degrade enemy before invasion
Wrap up
Jonathan notes this was only about a third of the full article which provides fascinating insights. He recommends reading it on the Foreign Affairs website. Part two of the video, recorded earlier, will be released in a couple hours. He thanks listeners for their support.
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