Ukraine War Update NEWS: Pt 1 - Overnight & Other News
Table of Contents 📖
"You have every right now to send nuclear missiles in because we are admitting that we as America have escalated. Do you know how fricking dangerous that is?"
Hello Team
🎦 00:00-01:40⏩
Jonathan welcomes viewers to the 1000th day of the war. He notes that neither side predicted the conflict would last so long and that allies have not sufficiently supported Ukraine to hasten an end to the war. He expresses concern about the incoming US administration's apparent unwillingness to support Ukraine, evidenced by its negative response to Ukraine's use of ATACMS missiles in the Kursk region, a decision he believes will leave Europe to shoulder the burden of assisting Ukraine.
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🪦 DISCLAIMER FOR GENERAL STAFF LOSSES DATA
- These are real people with real lives and real families who love them. Don’t let the numbers sap your humanity.
- These numbers probably aren’t accurate but they’re the best we have and we don’t need them to be accurate to be indicative of patterns of activity.
- All losses are estimates. Losses cannot be counted with accuracy because of the conditions on the ground.
- Both sides would see it to be of their advantage to minimize their own losses maximize the other side’s losses.
- Neither side releases their losses but we have enough transparency from the Ukrainian side to have confidence in they are indicative.
- Personnel losses are hard to count. If a soldier gets injured, heals up, and returns to the front line only to get injured again, is that one loss or two? Also, how to deal with losses from PMC’s or soldiers fighting with RF from occupied territories?
- Equipment losses are hard to count. If an AA complex involves several parts and one part gets disabled, is that a loss, or a fraction of a loss? If a tank gets disabled, repaired, back into the fight, then disabled again, is that one lost tank or two?
- All recorded losses are vulnerable to multiple reporting. We have already seen numerous cases of multiple drones in the air reporting the same loss from different angles as multiple engagements.
- Losses are not always reported on the same day they occurred. It is frequent that drone losses are reported at least 24 hours after other terrestrial equipment losses. Certain losses may not be reported for days or weeks for military intelligence reasons.
General Staff Daily Figures - Russian Losses
🎦 01:40-02:28⏩
Jonathan analyses the daily figures from the Ukrainian General Staff, highlighting the high number of Russian personnel losses (1,610), tanks (17), armoured personnel vehicles (33), artillery systems (46), vehicles and fuel tanks, and special equipment (17). He emphasises the challenges these losses present for Russia.
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Oryx Daily Figures: Combat Asset Losses
🎦 02:28-02:53⏩
Jonathan cites Andrew Perpetua's daily statistics, dated 17/11/2024, reporting 95 Russian personnel killed in documented video footage. He estimates a loss ratio of approximately 4:1 for Russian combat assets to Ukrainian assets, with a personnel loss ratio of roughly 1.5:1.
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Oryx Daily Figures: Ukrainian Losses (and Vandal Drone Discussion)
🎦 02:53-06:29⏩
Jonathan discusses Ukrainian losses, noting the destruction of two radar systems, a boat, artillery damage (including to an M109), and three tanks. Notably, he mentions a Leopard 2A4 damaged by a Russian Lancet drone. He speculates about the variability of damage inflicted by Lancets, due to their diverse munitions. Further losses include four infantry fighting vehicles—a damaged Bradley, a damaged and a destroyed Marder—highlighting the increasing use of Marders on the front line. He notes that a Vandal drone, a new Russian fiber-optic controlled drone, destroyed the abandoned Marder. Jonathan expresses surprise at the design of the Vandal drone. Additional Ukrainian losses include several M113s, Humvees, Strykers, a Kozak, an IMV, and an unidentified damaged vehicle. He suggests that the imminent US aid package, likely to include armoured vehicles like Bradleys, will replenish these losses. On the Russian side, he points out a significant number of civilian vehicles—cars, motorcycles—among the losses, alongside a damaged TOR M2 air defence system, electronic warfare equipment, and artillery pieces like M46 and D30s. He notes the destruction of around ten tanks (T-72Bs, T-80s, T-62s) and nine infantry fighting vehicles (primarily BMP-2s and 3s), emphasizing the volume of Russian equipment losses. He also mentions several unidentified destroyed equipment pieces, making identification difficult.
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Kursk Front: False Claims and Missing Soldiers
🎦 06:29-08:25⏩
Jonathan elaborates on a previous report about Russian low-level commanders lying about territorial gains in the Kursk region, which he believes has led to misinformed decisions and ultimately put Russian units at risk. He connects this to reports of 60 soldiers from the 22nd Motorized Regiment missing in action in Kursk, citing the incident as a potential consequence of the misinformation within the Russian command hierarchy.
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Sevastopol: Assassination of Russian Naval Officer
🎦 08:25-09:33⏩
Footage has emerged of the explosion in Sevastopol on 13/11/2024, which targeted the car of a high-ranking Russian officer, Captain First Rank Valery Trankovsky, Chief of Staff of the 41st Brigade of Missile Ships and Boats of the Black Sea Fleet. The attack is attributed to partisan activity in Crimea, and it is speculated that the explosion was caused by an IED triggered by the car going over a speed bump. The assassination of such a senior officer highlights the increasing effectiveness of partisan operations in occupied Crimea.
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Russian Naval Command Relocates from Crimea to Novorossiysk
🎦 09:33-09:55⏩
As a result of the recent assassinations and partisan activities in Sevastopol, the Russian naval command, including families, has relocated from Crimea to Novorossiysk.
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Ukraine Drone Strikes - Night of 18/11/2024
🎦 09:55-10:44⏩
Another night of heavy Ukrainian drone activity saw 87 drones launched into Ukrainian airspace. Russian air defences claimed to have shot down 51, with 30 neutralized by electronic warfare. This leaves potentially five or six drones having hit their targets, a large number compared to recent trends. Jonathan notes that the number of drones getting through can vary considerably from night to night.
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Analysis of Russian Missile Strikes & Interception Rates
🎦 10:44-15:31⏩
Jonathan analyses data on Russian missile strikes and interception rates, using Dell's statistics available in the video description. He presents a graph depicting the number of intercepted missiles and the total number of missiles fired, revealing a period of stockpiling by Russia since October 2022. He highlights that the recent attack on 17/11/2024 was the largest since December 29, 2023 and the second largest since September 2022, with an 85% interception rate claimed by Ukraine. Despite this, some missiles successfully hit critical power infrastructure targets, primarily in Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast, Lviv, Poltava, Donetsk, and Odessa Oblasts, forcing Ukrainians to implement stabilization blackouts. The attack also caused significant damage to DTEK, Ukraine's largest private energy company's thermal power plants, which could have long-term consequences for Ukraine's power grid and generation capacity. He questions whether this marks the beginning of a third Russian missile campaign targeting Ukraine's power grid, acknowledging the likelihood of continued strikes based on Russia's past behaviour. However, he believes that Sunday's attack, while substantial, is unlikely to have exhausted Russia's missile potential given their ongoing stockpiling efforts. Addressing viewer comments, Jonathan states his belief that the recent strikes on ammunition depots likely did not target cruise missile stocks, as these would be stored separately. He suspects that Russian production of cruise missiles has remained fairly consistent despite sanctions, suggesting that the high density of missiles fired earlier in the war depleted their initial stockpile, leading to a current rate of missile strikes aligned with their production capacity. He concludes that the graph suggests a fairly consistent monthly number of missiles being fired since October 2022.
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Russian Strikes on Sumy and Kharkiv
🎦 15:31-16:29⏩
Jonathan reports on continued Russian strikes in Sumy, highlighting the recovery of a mother and child's bodies from the rubble of a five-story residential building in Khryukiv. He condemns Russia's relentless targeting of residential areas, citing it as typical behaviour. He also mentions a Russian strike on a dormitory in Kharkiv's Kusumi region, resulting in six preliminary fatalities, including a child, and 12 injuries, including two minors, highlighting the impact of these attacks on children.
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Russian Missile Strikes in Zaporizhzhia and Odessa
🎦 16:29-18:18⏩
Explosions in Zaporizhzhia led to a power outage in half the city on the evening of 18/11/2024, suggesting a strike on an energy infrastructure target. A Russian ballistic missile attack on Odessa killed and injured several people, likely hitting a police station. Jonathan quotes Odessa Mayor Trukhanov's Telegram statement, who states that Russia "treacherously aimed a missile into a residential building, an area of business activity". The death toll in Odessa has risen to 10, with seven police officers and medics, and two civilians dead. 39 individuals were injured, including 14 police officers. Tim White reports that images have been released of the seven police officers killed and the first image of Odessa's Agricultural University, which suffered damage from a falling missile.
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UNESCO Condemns Russian Strikes on Odessa's Historic Centre
🎦 18:18-19:44⏩
Jonathan underscores the significance of Odessa as a major export facility, vital for Ukraine's economy and morale. Russia's repeated targeting of Odessa is likely intended to undermine Ukrainian spirit. UNESCO has condemned the 15/11/2024 overnight strikes on Odessa's historic centre, which damaged numerous architectural monuments. However, Jonathan criticizes the UN's perceived lack of meaningful action. He reports at least 25 deaths and 79 injuries from Russian attacks across Ukraine in the last 24 hours, noting a recent increase in civilian casualties, particularly children and police officers.
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Ukraine Granted Permission to use ATACMS (and incoming US administration's opposition)
🎦 19:44-28:15⏩
Jonathan reports that Joseph Burrell has confirmed US approval for Ukrainian strikes up to 300km into Russia, although it is unclear whether this is limited to the Kursk region. He highlights the significant difference the increased range of ATACMS (80km to 300km) will make, noting that limited supplies mean they will be used sparingly against high-value targets. He anticipates explosive developments ahead. Fabian Hoffman discusses the potential effectiveness of ATACMS strikes on Russian soil, arguing that their impact depends on the quantity supplied. While they have proven effective, Russia has demonstrated the capability to intercept them. This necessitates Ukraine deploying large numbers of ATACMS to ensure hits on target points. Their effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if combined with Storm Shadow and Scalp-EG strikes, which would complicate Russia's missile defence efforts. In response, Russia is expected to escalate grey zone measures. Reports suggest that Ukraine might have already used ATACMS, potentially striking the 1046th Logistics Centre arsenal in Karachev, Bryansk region. The General Staff reported 12 secondary explosions and a detonation in the target area. RBC Ukraine, citing sources, claims this attack involved the first use of ATACMS. While pleased about Ukraine's permission to use ATACMS, Jonathan expresses frustration with the incoming Trump administration's wholly negative response. He critiques Mike Waltz, an incoming administration member, for stating that the ATACMS usage is "another step up the escalation ladder," arguing that this rhetoric plays into Russia's hands by framing America as the escalator. He believes that Europe will need to independently support Ukraine, as the US, under Trump, appears unreliable. Jonathan expresses his frustration with the US's consistent focus on escalation, suggesting that the incoming administration is actively undermining Ukraine. He advocates for a more proactive approach, arguing that granting Ukraine permission to use ATACMS should have been a given from the outset, considering Russia's relentless attacks on Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure. He criticizes the constant self-imposed red lines set by the US, like the initial refusal to provide F-16s, which Russia then exploits for propaganda purposes. He suggests that the US should stop framing every Ukrainian action as an escalation, as this empowers Russia. He laments the lack of support for Ukraine within the incoming Trump administration, finding it depressing that figures like Mike Waltz are seemingly against Ukraine. He believes that Europe must step up and lead in supporting Ukraine, independent of the US, as the current signals from the incoming administration are concerning.
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Russia Updates Nuclear Doctrine
🎦 28:15-29:07⏩
Putin has approved an updated nuclear doctrine, in a move Jonathan interprets as classic nuclear sabre-rattling similar to past responses to perceived red lines being crossed. Russia now claims the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of WMDs against it or its allies, or in the event of aggression against it or Belarus involving conventional weapons. Jonathan views this as a broad justification for Russia to use nuclear weapons as it sees fit. The updated doctrine also states that aggression by any non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power will be considered a joint attack on Russia, further broadening the circumstances under which Russia might justify nuclear weapon use.
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Carl Weiss Thread: Situation Update
🎦 29:07-40:06⏩
Jonathan delves into a new thread by Carl Weiss, a reportedly anonymous Estonian intelligence analyst known for insightful analyses. Weiss asserts that Russia is pressing hard on 2-3 fronts, including the Kursk front, where they've gained control of a third of previously Ukrainian-occupied territory. He notes the psychological impact of these gradual Russian gains on Ukraine. On the Kupyansk front, at the northernmost point of the eastern front, Russia is applying pressure, with diversionary groups making brief incursions, though not necessarily gaining full control. Ukraine anticipated a major missile attack, which occurred two nights ago. Initial assessments suggest the results are less severe than feared, with Ukraine achieving a high interception rate, taking down 7 out of 8 Kinzhal missiles. Importantly, not all Kinzhals targeted Kyiv, suggesting that Ukraine has expanded its anti-ballistic missile capabilities geographically, potentially deploying SAMP/T or Patriot PAC-3 systems outside of Kyiv. Weiss confirms that Ukraine's air defence capabilities appear to have expanded geographically. Energy infrastructure was hit in the attacks but not as severely as expected. Power has already been restored in Kyiv and Dnipro within a couple of hours. Russia's success rate with drone attacks has also significantly declined, with only 5-6 out of 100 drones, on average, getting through. Jonathan speculates that some of the drones might be decoys without warheads, or mapping drones. In the Zaporizhzhia direction, nothing significant for Ukraine is currently happening. Russia's focus elsewhere appears to be on reclaiming lost territory and securing full control of Donbas. In Donetsk Oblast, there is no significant pressure towards Kramatorsk or Slovyansk, with the Russians stalled near Chasiv Yar. Russia's success in the southern part of the eastern front, exemplified by their advances after the fall of Avdiivka, hasn't been replicated near Votoda. While Ukraine's retreat continues, it's described as a controlled retreat, unlike the more chaotic situation in Avdiivka. Weiss asserts that, unlike in Western Europe, Trump's victory is not perceived as a tragedy in Ukraine, as they were not supportive of Harris either. Biden and Sullivan's perceived inaction and caution regarding Russia left Ukrainians neutral about the US election. They believe Trump is more capable of surprise and forceful action, whereas they feared a Harris administration would mirror Biden's. Jonathan disagrees with this assessment, believing that Harris would have been stronger than Biden, expressing disappointment that the incoming Trump administration appears to be largely anti-Ukraine. He criticizes Mike Waltz, who initially seemed like a potentially pro-Ukraine figure, for echoing Russian propaganda about US escalation. He also criticizes the appointment of Tulsi Gabbard, a known Russian sympathizer, to Trump's cabinet, alongside other questionable figures like Robert Gates. However, Weiss suggests a potential silver lining: Biden, now unburdened by re-election concerns, might accelerate the delivery of the $7.1 billion in outstanding PDA and USAI assistance to Ukraine to cement his legacy. He also notes that the approaching winter weather, with increased cloud cover, will likely reduce Russian air force activity and the use of guided glide bombs, easing pressure on Ukraine. Regarding Scholz's recent call with Putin, Weiss confirms that Putin's goals remain unchanged, sticking to his maximalist demands from December 2021. The call yielded no valuable information other than revealing Putin's unwillingness to negotiate. Weiss notes that there is potential for Friedrich Merz, of the CDU, to establish personal contact with Trump. The future of German support for Ukraine hinges on the outcome of the upcoming elections, including whether Scholz will even run as the SPD's candidate, or if he will be replaced by a more popular figure like Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. Scholz's departure would be welcomed from the perspective of Ukraine and transatlantic cooperation, but it doesn't solve all problems. While Macron-Trump relations seem decent, Keir Starmer's open endorsement of Harris might hinder UK-US relations under Trump. Unlike Johnson and Sunak, who were willing to bypass Biden, Starmer appears to be closely aligning with US policy, diminishing the UK's proactive role in supporting Ukraine. Jonathan believes this might change, envisioning a potential pro-Ukraine axis emerging in Europe, involving Tusk, Starmer, Macron, and possibly Germany. Weiss highlights the mounting economic pressure on Russia, with interest rates at 21% and rising, and increasing pressure on Elvira Nabiullina, the head of the Central Bank. He welcomes the potential for Russia to resort to printing more money, which could destabilize their economy. The Moscow Times has reported that the Central Bank will print $100 billion to bail out state banks, a move with significant potential implications. He notes that while current Defense Minister Borisov advocates for printing money when funds are lacking, Putin himself has historically resisted this, remembering the consequences of such actions in the late 1980s. However, Russia's reserves are dwindling and could be exhausted within a year. The combination of potential hyperinflation, high interest rates, and shrinking reserves could create serious problems for Russia, though for now, there seems to be no political force capable of challenging Putin's regime. The opposition abroad is deemed ineffective and infiltrated by the FSB. Weiss identifies three key issues to watch in the coming weeks and months: frontline progress, allied financing of Ukraine, and how Trump pursues his peace proposals. He believes a ceasefire is unlikely while Russia continues to advance, and that only a worsening situation for Russia might make them consider peace.
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Ukraine Economy Shows Growth
🎦 40:06-40:30⏩
In contrast to Russia's economic woes, Ukraine's economy has grown by 4.2% year-on-year in the first 10 months of 2024, driven by construction, transportation, and manufacturing sectors.
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British Influence in Ukrainian Dnipro River Operation
🎦 40:30-42:25⏩
Jonathan reveals that, according to Ukrainska Pravda, Great Britain persuaded Ukraine to launch an operation on the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson in 2023. The operation's maximum objective was to reach the Crimean border, but it only succeeded in establishing a foothold in Krynky. The minimum objective was to expand the bridgehead and cut the M14 highway, which also proved unsuccessful. Despite not achieving its initial goals, the operation benefited Ukraine by drawing Russian forces into a trap around Krynky, where Ukrainian artillery and HIMARS could inflict heavy losses. While Ukraine lost troops, the cost was deemed worthwhile given the damage inflicted on Russian forces. Jonathan finds it noteworthy that the British apparently influenced this operation, and that the Ukrainians' initial goals were far more ambitious than what they could ultimately achieve.
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Wrap up
🎦 42:25-42:26⏩
Jonathan thanks viewers for listening and bids them farewell.
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